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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis which consists of three empirical papers examines the economic impact of 
natural disasters. 
The first paper estimates the impact of natural disasters on financial development proxied 
by private credit. Employing a panel fixed effects estimator on a country-level panel data 
set covering 147 countries for the period from 1979 to 2011, it finds that companies and 
households get deeper into debt after a natural disaster in the short run. This effect is 
stronger in poorer countries whilst the effect is weaker in countries where agriculture is 
more important. In the long run, capital markets appear to improve. Findings are robust 
to alternative estimators, specifications, samples and data.  
The second paper explores the impact of natural disasters on the concentration of 
charitable receipts, again using country-level panel data. This analysis uses disaster 
indices purely based on physical intensities of natural disasters, thus overcome common 
issue of endogeneity in disaster data.  In the short run, disasters expand the number of 
categories under which countries receive foreign aid and reduce the dependence on a 
single donor. Disasters reduce the concentration of the aid portfolio of recipient countries 
as measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Findings are robust across alternative 
estimators. The study presents evidence of long term effects, too. 
The third paper studies the relationship between natural disasters and income inequality 
in Sri Lanka as the first study of this nature for the country. It constructs regional 
inequality indices from micro data for Sri Lanka. Natural disasters do not affect 
expenditure inequality, but reduce income inequality. Natural disasters decrease non-
seasonal agricultural and non-agricultural income inequality but increase seasonal 
agricultural income inequality. Income of richer households is mainly derived from non-
agricultural sources such as manufacturing and business activities and non-seasonal 
agricultural activities. Poorer households have a comparatively higher share of seasonal 
agricultural income. 
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1 Introduction 
Natural disasters have notably negative impacts on people (Hallegatte, Vogt-Schilb, 
Bangalore, & Rozenberg, 2017, p. 20). The impact of natural disasters may vary 
according to the disaster magnitude, intensity, frequency, risk, extent of the exposure and 
duration, and vulnerability1. Natural disasters cause a serious disruption to the functioning 
of a community or society through loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property 
damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or 
environmental degradation (UN General Assembly, 2009). 
Natural disasters adversely impact economies in general and negatively affect growth. 
Hochrainer (2009) finds significant negative consequences of natural disasters on GDP. 
Raddatz (2007, 2009) also finds that climatic disasters reduce real GDP per capita. With 
evidence from Central American and Caribbean regions, Strobl (2012) shows that 
hurricanes negatively impact economic growth. When measured by property damage, 
natural disasters have negative effects on the macro-economy (Noy, 2009). Using natural 
disaster data purely based on physical intensities of such disasters, Felbermayr and 
Gröschl (2014) establish that natural disasters lower GDP per capita with low and middle 
income countries experiencing higher losses. Natural disasters are a drive for poverty and 
keep or pull back people into poverty; also, natural disasters impede economic 
development and hinder poverty reduction (Hallegatte et al., 2017). Sometimes, negative 
effects of natural disasters not only escalate poverty and deprivation in the short run but 
                                                          
1 The UNISDR defines  
a) Disaster risk as the potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a 
system, society or a community in a specific period of time, determined probabilistically as a function of 
hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity;  
b) Exposure as the situation of people, infrastructure, housing, production capacities and other tangible human 
assets located in hazard-prone areas; and  
c) Vulnerability as the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or 
processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts 
of hazards. (UNISDR, 2009) 
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also drive poor households into long-term poverty, triggering poverty traps (Carter, Little, 
Mogues, & Negatu, 2007). Conducting a meta-regression analysis on a large number of 
empirical studies, Klomp and Valckx (2014) conclude that there are genuine negative 
effects of natural disasters on economic growth.  
Disasters destroy human and physical capital including infrastructure and thereby hamper 
economic activity. Natural disasters overwhelm economies and reduce welfare of the 
agents of the affected economy through mortality, morbidity and loss of physical assets. 
Subsequent to a natural catastrophe, the affected economy enters into a recovery phase. 
Recovery needs finances to rebuild the destroyed capital, and the recovery is faster and 
effective when finances are readily available. As poor countries are less prepared for and 
more vulnerable to disasters, they are in a disadvantageous position. Thus, foreign aid 
and credit have a major influence on their recovery. As developed financial systems can 
efficiently facilitate recovery financial requirement, financial development plays a key 
role. In the recovery phase, natural disasters can contribute to short term economic growth 
via reconstruction efforts. This is more if the replaced capital is more advanced than the 
destroyed. Therefore, short run economic impact of disasters could be mixed but probably 
negative (Tol, 2014, pp. 103-104). If climate change causes more and severe natural 
disasters, then it would be a matter of grave concern (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014, p. 
93). In such a scenario, disaster risk management strategies and investments should be 
adjusted to account for future climate consequences (McDermott, 2016). 
However, some scholars suggest a positive correlation between natural disaster 
frequencies and economic growth (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969; 
Skidmore & Toya, 2002). In particular, investigating long-run effects of natural disasters, 
Skidmore and Toya (2002) find that climatic disasters are positively correlated with 
economic growth. 
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Severe natural disasters are destructive and costly. Their occurrence is beyond human 
control and their negative economic consequences are mostly unavoidable, especially for 
poor countries. Appreciating the major global impact of disasters, nations have come 
forward together to reduce disaster risk through Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR, 2015).  As Noy, Managi, and Hallegatte (2017) point out, disasters 
play a key role in health, public finance, labour markets, development and other economic 
areas. As such, it is worthwhile to explore the impact of natural disasters on different 
economic aspects of development.  
This thesis focuses on natural disaster consequences under three themes. First two papers 
analyse the disaster impact at macro level on financial development and foreign aid 
concentration, respectively, using cross country panel data sets. The final paper focuses 
on micro data and studies how natural disasters affect income inequality at regional level 
in a lower middle income country, namely Sri Lanka. 
Generally, natural disasters reduce economic growth. This effect is more pronounced in 
countries where there are weak capital markets. Therefore, in the aftermath of natural 
disasters, it is essential to have quick and unconstrained access to finances for smooth and 
speedy recovery. Tol and Leek (1999) show that recovery finances could be acquired 
through assistance (credit or aid), savings and insurance. Thus, a stronger financial sector 
is important (Skidmore, 2001). Infrastructure can be easily reconstituted when there are 
well-functioning financial markets (Gignoux & Menéndez, 2016).  Therefore, the level 
of financial development plays a key role. Expanding financial inclusion is one way of 
reducing well-being losses of natural disasters (Hallegatte et al., 2017). McDermott, 
Barry, and Tol (2014) find a significant negative impact of natural disasters on economic 
growth which is mitigated by higher credit.   
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In this background, the first paper of this thesis estimates the impact of natural disasters 
on financial development proxied by private credit. Apart from a study of Klomp (2014) 
which focuses on disaster impact on financial fragility as measured by banks’ distance to 
default, to my knowledge, there is no other study to explore the impact of natural disasters 
on financial development. Therefore, the first paper of this thesis contributes to the 
existing literature by bridging a gap. 
The analysis is based on a country-level panel data set covering 147 countries for the 
period from 1979 to 2011. Disaster data for this paper are obtained from EM-DAT, the 
International Disaster Database (Guha-Sapir, Below, & Hoyois, 2014). The variable of 
interest, disaster measure is constructed as the percentage of population affected due to 
all natural disasters in a country year. As Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine 
(2012) illustrate, financial development has many facets. Financial development is 
indicated by higher level of access to, depth, efficiency and stability of financial 
institutions and markets. Widely used credit variable, i.e., the domestic credit to the 
private sector by deposit money banks as percentage of GDP (Čihák, Demirgüč-Kunt, 
Feyen, & Levine, 2013) is used to calculate per capita credit to be used in the analysis to 
proxy financial development. Credit measure is chosen given its wide data coverage, and 
the vital role played by private credit. Nevertheless, as financial markets are less well 
developed in low-income countries, the role played by formal credit in disaster 
consequences might be small.  
Employing a panel fixed effects estimator as the main estimation tool, the paper finds that 
companies and households get deeper into debt after a natural disaster. This effect is 
stronger in poorer countries whilst the effect is weaker in countries where agriculture is 
more important. The magnitude of per capita credit varies across countries regardless of 
their per capita income. Hence, the real impact of disasters on credit as a share of 
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prevailing per capita credit is country specific as well as time specific.  These findings 
are robust to alternative estimators, specifications and samples. Considering the potential 
endogeneity issue of disaster data of EM-DAT, the analysis is repeated using an 
alternative disaster data set i.e., the ifo GAME data (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014) which 
is purely based on physical intensities of natural disasters. This exercise also yields 
consistent results. Private credit is only one dimension of financial development and 
financial markets are less well developed in poor countries which are more vulnerable to 
disasters. Thus, the immediate impact of natural disasters is better interpreted as 
households getting (further) into debt rather than as financial development, but we find 
longer term impacts too that indicate an expansion of credit availability.  
The second empirical paper explores the impact of natural disasters on foreign aid 
concentration. Natural catastrophes bring in devastating economic episodes for countries 
through destruction. Sudden and large damages to infrastructure and physical capital 
losses paralyse governments eroding their capacity for reconstruction. As such, foreign 
aid can play a vital role in rebuilding after a severe natural disaster by fulfilling recovery 
financial requirements.  
Natural disasters attract more foreign aid owing to various donor motives (Becerra, 
Cavallo, & Noy, 2014, 2015; Wei, Marinova, & Zhao, 2014; Wood & Wright, 2016). 
Although, it is expected donors to donate disaster related donations mainly on 
humanitarian motives, in practice, humanitarian aid is influenced by historical, political, 
cultural, religious or other pre-disaster connections donors have with recipients. For 
instance, analysing U.S. foreign disaster data from 1964 to 1995, Drury, Olson, and Belle 
(2005) highlight that U.S. foreign disaster assistance is strongly political, specifically at 
the disbursement compared to the allocation.  
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Yang (2008) shows that natural disasters considerably increase foreign aid. This is more 
when the international media coverage is broader for the disaster event. This aid 
supposedly facilitates speedy and smooth recovery and reconstruction after natural 
disasters.  However, there is evidence also to suggest that past foreign aid flows suppress 
the political willingness to invest on disaster prevention and mitigation intentions 
(Raschky & Schwindt, 2016).  
Whatever the underlying motive is, it is obvious natural disasters to enhance disaster 
related aid which may be aimed at emergency, disaster relief and even preparedness. 
However, if disasters can attract aid aimed at other development categories such as health, 
education, industry, etc., apart from disaster related aid, it can be expected this to enable 
recipient countries to invest in a vast range of development areas. If disasters influence 
countries to attract aid from more donors, recipients’ donor base will be expanded. This 
will reduce single donor dependence and it can be expected this to strengthen the external 
network of the recipients from which recipients can seek support for development. In such 
a scenario, natural disasters reduce aid concentration of recipients. It can be expected that 
reduced aid concentration would facilitate economic growth through broadened 
investments and the support of a robust external network. However, the literature on the 
fragmentation of aid shows that, typically, aid is less effective in promoting economic 
development when it comes from many sources and is spread over many programmes 
(Gehring, Michaelowa, Dreher, & Spörri, 2017; Kimura, Mori, & Sawada, 2012; Oh & 
Kim, 2015; Sumner & Glennie, 2015). The second empirical paper thus shows that, 
besides the negative effect of natural disasters on economic growth, natural disasters also 
have a negative impact on development aid. 
To my knowledge, no one has looked at the relationship between natural disasters and aid 
concentration, before. The only related study I know is Becerra et al. (2015) which 
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presents some evidence of cross-sectorial substitution where donors sometime decrease 
aid aimed at other sectors in order to increase humanitarian aid given to the same 
recipient. Thus, this study allows me to contribute to the literature. 
I examine the impact of natural disasters on the concentration of charitable receipts using 
country-level panel data for the period from 1979 to 2010. Natural disaster data used in 
this analysis are taken from the ifo GAME data (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014). It contains 
disaster indices which are purely based on physical intensities of disasters and strictly 
exogenous to social and economic conditions of countries. Therefore, they overcome 
entirely the common issue of endogeneity in natural disaster data. Using panel fixed 
effects estimator, I show that natural disasters enhance the diversification of aid 
categories, increase the number of donor entities and reduce aid concentration as 
measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Hirschman, 1964) of recipient countries in the 
short run. Findings are robust to various checks. In the long run also, I observe statistically 
significant negative impact of natural disasters on foreign aid concentration. 
Although, ifo GAME data do not suffer from endogeneity problem, one can argue that 
disasters can be considered as real natural disasters only when they cause losses to the 
human beings (Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969, p. 3). Therefore, I repeat my analysis using the 
disaster measure constructed using EM-DAT data for my first paper as discussed above, 
i.e., the percentage of population affected due to all natural disasters in a given year. This 
analysis also yields consistent results supporting original findings of this paper. 
Natural disasters disproportionately affect the poor. Hallegatte et al. (2017, p. 4) recognise 
five underlying reasons for this. They are, overexposure; higher vulnerability; less ability 
to cope and recover; permanent impacts on education and health; and effects of risk on 
savings and investment behaviour. It is therefore often assumed that natural disasters 
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increase income inequality. However, as Karim and Noy (2016) show, currently, there is 
only a little research on this matter. I contribute with my third and final paper which 
investigates the relationship between natural disasters and income inequality in Sri Lanka, 
as the first study of this nature for the country.  
Generally, the poor households are more vulnerable to disasters and they bear disaster 
damages at a higher cost compared to the rich (Karim & Noy, 2016). The poor are more 
likely to have irregular income, so that every disruption, either due to the disaster directly 
or dealing with the aftermath, means a loss in income for them. The poor may be more 
vulnerable to loss of income due to their inability to engage in work and the unavoidable 
sale of income deriving capital assets as a coping strategy. If poorer households are less 
prepared for disasters; the poor live in disaster prone areas and homes that are more likely 
to be damaged; and receive earnings mainly from sectors such as weather dependent 
traditional agriculture which are more likely to face downturn, poor would bear higher 
income losses compared to the rich. Accordingly, natural disasters could give rise to 
greater income inequality.  
In his cross country analysis, Yamamura (2015) finds that natural disasters increase 
income inequality. However, as disaster impact on households depends on country 
characteristics, cross country studies do not reveal the real picture (Karim & Noy, 2016). 
Therefore, country-level studies are required in this field.  
Among the few such studies so far, Bui, Dungey, Nguyen, and Pham (2014) find that 
natural disasters increased income inequality among households in Vietnam in 2008. 
However, in terms of the findings of Abdullah, Zander, Myers, Stacey, and Garnett 
(2016), income inequality was decreased after the Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh in 2009. 
Feng, Lu, Nolen, and Wang (2016) did not find a change in income inequality among 
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households due to 2008 Sichuan earthquake despite the 14% reduction in household 
income.  
Although these findings may appear to be surprising, at subsistence level, people possess 
little that can be lost to a natural disaster. However, losses for the richer may be greater 
as disasters destroy their physical assets and negatively affect small businesses. 
Contracted wage earners are less likely to be affected by disasters. On the other hand, 
disasters may open up new informal financial opportunities for unskilled labour. 
Therefore, evidence on the impact of natural disasters on income inequality is mixed.  
As Sri Lanka is a lower middle income country constantly faced by different natural 
disasters such as floods, droughts, storms and earth slides due to its geographical features 
and location, Sri Lanka provides a good case study. The analysis uses a unique panel data 
set constructed for the purpose of the paper. It contains district inequality measures based 
on household income reported in six waves of the Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey of Sri Lanka during the period between 1990 and 2013, data on disaster affected 
population and other economic and social indicators.  
Employing a panel fixed effects estimator, I find that contemporaneous natural disasters 
and their immediate lags substantially decrease inequality in per adult equivalent 
household income as measured by the Theil index. Findings are robust across various 
inequality metrics, sub-samples and alternative estimators such as Ordinary Least Squares 
and System GMM. However, natural disasters do not affect household expenditure 
inequality. Either households behave as if they have a permanent income or all 
households reduce their expenditure proportionately irrespective of their income level in 
responding to natural disasters.   
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My data allow me to decompose income inequality into components of income so that 
mechanisms are understood better. This exercise shows that the reduction in income 
inequality is not derived through enhanced receipts or remittances. Natural disasters 
decrease non-seasonal agricultural income inequality and non-agricultural income 
inequality. But, disasters increase seasonal agricultural income inequality. This is 
explained by the fact that income of richer households is mainly derived from non-
agricultural sources such as manufacturing and business activities and non-seasonal 
agricultural activities. In contrary, poorer households have a higher share of agricultural 
income. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter examines the impact of 
natural disasters on financial development proxied by private credit. The third chapter 
explores the influences natural disasters have on foreign aid concentration of aid recipient 
countries. The fourth chapter investigates the impact of natural disasters on income 
inequality in Sri Lanka. The fifth and final chapter concludes.  
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2 Impact of Natural Disasters on Financial 
Development 
 Introduction 
Natural disasters are inherently destructive, disruptive and costly in the short run, and 
may hamper economic growth too. Vice versa, poorer countries, and particularly 
financially underdeveloped countries are more vulnerable to natural disasters. This paper 
contributes to the study of the nexus of disasters and growth by estimating the impact of 
natural disasters on financial development. 
The literature on the impact of natural disasters on economic growth is as yet 
inconclusive. Natural disasters are seen as a major impediment for global development 
efforts (UNISDR, 2002) and the resolution dated 18 February 2009 adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations (UN General Assembly, 2009) stresses the fact 
that the impacts of natural disasters heavily hinder the achievement of internationally 
agreed development targets. Sometimes negative effects of natural disasters not only 
escalate poverty and deprivation in the short run but also drive poor households into long-
term poverty, triggering poverty traps (Carter et al., 2007).  
Although natural disasters are considered as negative for growth in general (Felbermayr 
& Gröschl, 2014; Raddatz, 2007; Strobl, 2012), some literature suggest a positive 
correlation between natural disaster frequencies and economic growth (Albala-Bertrand, 
1993; Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969; Skidmore & Toya, 2002).   
The level of financial development plays a key role. Specifically, in the recuperation 
subsequent to a disaster, it is necessary to have quick and unconstrained access to finances 
for immediate and smooth recovery. If the recovery investments bring in better and 
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advanced technology, it not only ensures the speedy recovery but also paves the way for 
a higher economic growth. Insurance claims, own savings, aid and grants from the 
government and third parties, third party investments and indebtedness are the means to 
meet this financial need. There is a higher propensity to save in disaster vulnerable 
countries like Japan (Skidmore, 2001). As Tol and Leek (1999) point out required 
finances can be acquired through assistance (credit or aid), savings or insurance. In 
reducing economic damages caused by disasters, a strong financial sector is therefore 
important (Toya & Skidmore, 2007). As Gignoux and Menéndez (2016) highlight, it is 
possible to reconstitute publicly and privately owned infrastructure capital if there are 
well-functioning financial markets. If finances are readily available, it facilitates the 
speedy recovery which in turn enhances the development and regaining of the pre-disaster 
economic growth.  
Countries with higher levels of domestic credit better able to withstand and endure natural 
disasters without affecting their economic output much (Noy, 2009).  McDermott et al. 
(2014) find that natural disasters have a significant negative contemporaneous impact on 
economic growth which is mitigated by higher credit.  
This raises the question whether natural disasters also affect financial development of an 
economy.  Klomp (2014) highlights that natural disasters increase the likelihood of banks’ 
default. Apart from this piece of work, which focuses on bank Z-scores and not on 
financial development per se, we do not find any other study in the existing literature 
which explores the impact of natural disasters on financial development. Hence, we probe 
the relationship between natural disasters and financial development. 
In such an analysis one cannot completely rule out the endogeneity between financial 
development and the impact of natural disasters. For instance, Von Peter, Von Dahlen, 
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and Saxena (2012) find that negative macroeconomic impact of natural disasters is mainly 
derived through uninsured losses. When the insurance rate is high, economic damages 
associated with disasters tend to be low. 
Accordingly, in this paper we explore whether there is any impact of natural disasters on 
financial development proxied by credit, if so in which direction and in what magnitude 
and how it depends on other economic factors. At a broader level, financial development 
can be defined as the improvement in the quality of five key financial functions: (1) 
producing and processing information about possible investments and allocating capital 
based on these assessments; (2) monitoring individuals and firms and exerting corporate 
governance after allocating capital; (3) facilitating the trading, diversification, and 
management of risk; (4) mobilising and pooling savings; and (5) easing the exchange of 
goods, services, and financial instruments (Čihák et al., 2013, p. 9). Čihák et al. (2013) 
highlight level of access to, depth, efficiency and stability of financial institutions and 
markets. They present a 4x2 matrix of financial system characteristics and compile panel 
data which can be used as proxies for financial development. However, credit availability 
to the real sector by domestic banks as a percentage of GDP is used most in the literature. 
Its wide data coverage, and the vital role played by private credit may be the reasons for 
this.  
We also use private credit as proxy for financial development in our analysis. This 
measure reflects the extent to which households and companies depend on the banking 
system for their financial needs and the magnitude of financial intermediation facilitated 
by the banking system in return (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz, 2009).  Private credit can be 
considered as a reliable source to meet immediate financial requirement in the recovery 
phase of a disaster, especially for low-income countries where private savings rate and 
insurance penetration are considerably low. We acknowledge that private credit is only 
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one dimension, i.e. financial depth of financial development which has many facets as 
discussed above. Further, poor countries are more vulnerable to natural disasters and 
suffer disproportionately from disaster damages as opposed to rich countries. As financial 
markets are less well developed in low-income countries, the role played by formal credit 
in disaster consequences might be small, therein. Section 5 discusses alternative 
indicators of financial development, but data availability is problematic. We are therefore 
compelled to use credit measure as the main proxy for financial development in our 
analysis. 
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 Empirical Analysis 
2.2.1 Data 
The source of natural disaster data for this study is EM-DAT, the International Disaster 
Database maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in Brussels, Belgium (Guha-Sapir et al., 
2014).  The EM-DAT database contains inter-alia data on world-wide natural disasters 
occurred since 1900. Over 13,000 natural disaster events occurred in about 220 countries 
from 1900 to 2014 are reported in the database. As per the database, from 1979 to 2011, 
the period on which the instant study is focused for the reasons of data quality and 
availability, over 10,000 natural disaster events have occurred in 219 countries affecting 
more than six billion people.  
EM-DAT classifies natural disasters into subgroups, namely, biological, climatic, 
hydrological, geophysical, meteorological and extraterrestrial disasters. Each natural 
disaster subgroup contains data on relevant types and sub-types of natural disaster events.  
For a natural disaster to enter into the EM-DAT database, at least one of the setout criteria  
needs to be fulfilled, i.e., reported death toll of 10 or more, 100 people reported affected, 
a call for international assistance or the declaration of state of emergency.  As highlighted 
by Miao and Popp (2014), these are arbitrary thresholds. There is a tendency for national 
governments to exaggerate the disaster damage in reporting as a strategy for attracting 
external aid, especially in developing countries (Noy, 2009). Still, EM-DAT is the source 
of data that has been used widely in disaster literature.  
The EM-DAT database contains disaster outcomes measured as the number of total 
deaths, number of people affected (injured, became homeless, displaced or affected 
otherwise) and the total monetary damage caused by a disaster. The economic data may 
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be gathered by the individuals who attend the affected area primarily with the intention 
of providing medical care and physical aid. Therefore, they may lack the expertise to 
estimate of the economic loss. Of the numbers of people killed and affected, the preferred 
variable is the number of people affected. In some instances, even a severe disaster may 
not kill as shown by Gassebner, Keck, and Teh (2010), Cavallo and Noy (2011) and 
Klomp (2014). Hence, in this study, the number of people affected by natural disasters in 
a country year is chosen as the variable of interest. Accordingly, our analysis is limited 
to disasters where there are reported affected population. Following Noy (2009), the 
disaster variable is normalised as the “percentage of population affected”. 
There are 2,712 country-years with at least one disaster. On average, disasters affect 3.6% 
of the population in a country-year and the maximum percentage of population affected 
by natural disasters in a single country-year surpasses 150%. Hydrological disasters are 
the most common natural disaster. However, climatic disasters affect the highest 
percentage of population, with meteorological disasters next in line. See Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Severity of disasters by % of population affected 
      Disaster Type Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
All Disaster Events 2,712 3.64 11.27 1.65e-06 156.78 
Biological 710 0.23 1.36 6.85e-07 25.16 
Climatic 522 8.98 18.11 2.13e-06 118.47 
Hydrological 1,718 1.21 3.62 1.65e-06 45.24 
Geophysical 528 0.67 3.37 5.03e-07 48.51 
Meteorological 861 3.01 11.59 1.39e-06 156.78 
      
 
The number of people affected by a disaster depends on the nature of the disaster as well 
as on the underlying socio-economic status and disaster management strategies of the 
affected economy, leading to endogeneity in models that quantify the economic impact 
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of natural disasters (Kellenberg & Mobarak, 2008; McDermott et al., 2014; Sen, 1983; 
Tol & Leek, 1999).  In order to reduce the endogeneity problem, while Noy (2009) and 
Klomp (2014) develop a count disaster measure, McDermott et al. (2014) construct a 
binary disaster variable imposing a threshold of 0.5 percent on the fraction of population 
affected to capture only the relatively severe disasters in the model. As a robustness 
check, McDermott et al. (2014) carry out their analysis using a binary disaster variable 
constructed without imposing any such threshold. They admit the fact that the binary 
variable reduces the variation of data and the explanatory power of the model. In spite of 
this they opt for a binary disaster variable as it reduces not only the influence of 
measurement error in disaster data on the analysis but also the possibility of results are 
being driven by outliers at the upper bound of the disaster data distribution. However, by 
doing this they equalise minor disaster events which affect a very few individuals with 
severe disaster events which affect hundreds of thousands of people. Further, it can be 
argued that the imposition of an arbitrary threshold to segregate large disasters would 
cause biases in the estimates. Yet, it is not less common in disaster studies to adopt such 
decision rules to isolate severe disasters to include in the model. For instance, Becerra et 
al. (2014) and Klomp (2014) deploy such decision rules to limit their investigation to 
major disasters. Exploring disaster effects on bank solvency, Klomp (2014) limits his 
sample to 170 severe disasters which caused highest economic damage and the time 
period from 1997 to 2010 in quantifying the impact of natural disasters on bank Z-score 
which reflects banks’ distance to default.  
Since there is a clear trade-off in using a binary disaster variable with or without a decision 
rule, the current analysis employs a continuous disaster variable, namely the percentage 
of population affected by natural disasters in a country year. Nevertheless, as a supportive 
identification strategy and a robustness check, the baseline model is run using a binary 
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disaster variable with various thresholds to segregate severe disasters in constructing the 
disaster dummy, as more fully described later on, to see whether it derives consistent 
results.  
This paper explores the impact of natural disasters on financial development. A widely 
used private credit measure is chosen to proxy financial development given its broad data 
coverage in space and time, although it only measures the depth of financial institutions.  
Data on private credit by deposit money banks as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) are obtained from the Global Financial Development Database, an open data 
source of the World Bank constructed by Čihák et al. (2013) covering 205 economies 
from 1960 to 2011.  They have constructed said credit variable using the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is 
defined as the domestic private credit to the real sector by deposit money banks as 
percentage of GDP. Accordingly, private credit does not include credit issued to 
governments, government agencies and public enterprises, and credit issued by central 
banks. This credit measure is used to construct the dependent variable of our model, i.e., 
private credit per capita. We use per capita credit, rather than credit per GDP, because per 
capita GDP is included in the regression model as a key explanatory variable. We thus 
avoid GDP being present on both sides of the equation. Furthermore, the variation in 
private credit per GDP the data may be due to the variation either in credit per se or in 
GDP; and both may vary in response to a natural disaster. The use of per capita private 
credit also resolves this issue. The measure of private credit as a percentage of GDP is 
converted to constant 2005 US dollar per capita credit using constant 2005 US dollar GDP 
data, thus accounting for dollar inflation over time. The analysis is repeated using 
purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 US dollar per capita credit, accounting for 
price differences across countries.   
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The level of credit depends on the level of income as that determines credit necessity and 
credit worthiness. Accordingly, the natural log of the output based real GDP per capita of 
the current year enters the regression along with its interaction with the disaster variable 
as regressors. Constant 2005 US dollar per capita GDP and PPP constant 2005 US dollar 
per capita GDP are calculated using relevant data contained in the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and the Penn World Tables (PWT) Version 8.0 database 
(Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2013), respectively.  
Political institutions play a vital role in disaster mitigation, which is at least to some extent 
a public good. Plumper and Neumayer (2010) argue that the polity2 variable from the 
Polity IV Project is the most appropriate and popular measure of a country’s political 
regime. Polity2 indicates openness of a country’s political institutions. In the Polity IV 
database, the democracy indicator (democ), which varies on an eleven-point scale (0-10), 
represents the institutionalised democracy of a state. It depends on 3 elements which 
cover the democratic rights of citizens and the constraints on the executive in exercising 
its powers.  Similarly, the institutionalised autocracy indicator (autoc), also an eleven-
point scale (0-10), measures the institutionalised authoritarianism of the regime of a 
country. These two scales democ and autoc do not share any contributor categories in 
common. The value of polity2 is obtained by subtracting the autocracy (autoc) from the 
democracy variable (democ). It ranges between +10 (strongly democratic) and -10 
(strongly autocratic). 
A country that heavily relies on agriculture, especially rainfed agriculture, can be 
expected to be particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, and 
storms. Both the destruction of cultivations and livestock and the disruption of transport 
and trade would affect the demand for credit and creditworthiness.  As such, agriculture 
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share of the economy together with its interaction with disaster variable is included in the 
benchmark specification. 
Data on the share of agriculture as a percentage of GDP and other controls such as 
inflation, government consumption as a percentage of GDP, share of trade as a percentage 
of GDP, net official development assistance (ODA) received as a percentage of gross 
national income (GNI), financial sector rating, lending interest rate, private savings rates 
and insurance penetration are taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. Data on resources of countries are obtained from the Wealth of Nations data 
series maintained by the World Bank.  
The sample consists of 147 countries during 1979 to 2011. The panel is unbalanced. With 
the inclusion of more control variables sample size decreases due to non-availability of 
data. Post estimation summary statistics for the variables used in the baseline analysis are 
provided in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics 
     Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Disaster (% of Population Affected) 1.69 6.89 0 118.47 
Credit per capita (constant 2005 US$) 6,547 15,583 0.85 163,982 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) 8,100 12,980 112 87,717 
Polity2  3.01 6.78 -10 10 
Share of Agriculture (as % of GDP) 17.46 14.76 0 73.48 
       
2.2.2 Empirical Model 
We employ a panel regression estimator with country and year fixed effects as the main 
estimation strategy in our analysis. Fixed effects estimator is chosen since country and 
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year fixed effects control for time-invariant country heterogeneity and time-variant 
shocks that simultaneously affect all the countries, respectively. This reduces any 
potential endogeneity issue. The Hausman test (Hausman & Taylor, 1981) shows that the 
fixed effects estimator is preferred to the random effects estimator. Furthermore, country-
fixed effects also arrest any selection biases which may arise due to over representation 
of poor countries in the disaster data distribution as a result of their higher vulnerability 
to disasters (McDermott et al., 2014). Year fixed effects capture the effects of time-
varying factors common to all countries such as the global business cycle, global 
technological advancement and world-wide economic and financial crises. Time-fixed 
effects are jointly significant. Errors are clustered at country level as natural disasters are 
not evenly distributed across countries and also to obtain robust standard errors as a 
remedial measure for heteroscedasticity. Given the constraints on availability and 
reliability of data, the analysis is restricted to the time period 1979 – 2011. The baseline 
model covers 147countries.  
The panel regression equation of the baseline model is as follows; 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +                                    𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (2.1)   
Credit per capita valued at constant 2005 US$ in country i for year t, is the dependent 
variable. A lagged credit term is included as an explanatory variable because it can 
reasonably be assumed that the current credit level is heavily determined by its past level 
and to defend the existence of autocorrelation in the regression. However, as by 
construction lagged dependent variable and error term are correlated, one may argue that 
the use of a lagged dependent variable in the fixed effects estimator poses a serious 
econometric problem. Such use can cause negative biases on estimates for positive 
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coefficients in short panels with small time periods. To overcome this issue the best 
remedy would be the use of a valid instrument variable, however, it is very hard to find 
such an instrument. As McDermott et al. (2014) show this is a serious concern only in the 
event the panel is short. They claim that the issue is being addressed by using a long panel 
of 29 years and they support their findings with consistent results obtained in dynamic 
panel estimators. Ours is an even lengthier panel of 33 years. We also get consistent 
results using System GMM. We obtain consistent results even when the specification is 
modelled without including the lagged dependent variable but including only disasters, 
logged GDP per capita and disaster-income interaction with and without further control 
variables as specified under the robustness checks.  
Dis is our variable of interest: Disaster measured as the percentage of population affected 
due to all the natural disasters occurred in a single country year. As the percentage of 
population affected increases, it can be expected the private credit to rise as a result of 
higher demand for financing aimed at recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster. As private credit availability is an indicator of financial 
development, a positive coefficient on the disaster variable would establish positive 
effects of disasters on financial development, although it may also indicate people getting 
into debt after a disaster.  
GDP is the logged GDP per capita in constant 2005 US$. It is included in the model as 
the level of credit clearly depends on income level. Demand for and the availability of 
credit are different in poor and rich economies. In poor countries, dependency on private 
credit appears to be much higher in the recovery phase of a natural disaster in that the 
private savings rate and insurance penetration are substantially lower. 
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The disaster variable is interacted with logged per capita GDP. We expect that a higher 
income reduces the need for debt-financing the recovery, because of higher savings and 
greater insurance cover. If so, the interaction term would be negative.  
The share of agriculture in GDP and its interaction with disasters are included in the bench 
mark specification to capture the effect of economic structure beyond development. As a 
country’s preparedness and management strategies for natural disasters depend on the 
political will and institutions of that country, we include polity2 as a control variable. 
Terms 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖  and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖  are the country and year fixed effects, respectively; 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the 
independently and identically distributed error term. 
When using a longer panel, one has to be careful because non-stationarity might give rise 
to spurious results as suggested by Nelson and Plosser (1982). As one can suspect a unit 
root in the credit data, we estimate the model using various approaches: levels, levels with 
lagged dependent variable, long averages, first differences, and first differences with first 
differences in the controls. The key results are robust. 
To ascertain medium-term dynamics of disasters, we include lags of disaster variable and 
its interactions with income and agriculture. 
To show our original results are not driven by outliers, we repeat our regressions 
removing alternatively and jointly observations at the lower and upper bounds of the 
credit distribution and at the upper bound of the disaster distribution. 
For identification, we assume that disasters are exogenous to credit. Although borrowed 
money can be used to fund protection against natural disasters, the probability is remote 
that contemporaneous credit affects vulnerability to disasters as it takes a long time for 
credit to be converted into effective and defensive disaster impact preventive or 
mitigating projects. The disaster exogeneity assumption is adopted by other disaster 
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papers including Noy (2009), Raddatz (2007), Ramcharan (2007) and Skidmore and Toya 
(2002). If the exogeneity assumption does not hold, then the best solution to avoid reverse 
causality would be to employ a valid instrument. However, it is extremely difficult to find 
such an instrument (Noy, 2009).  
Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) present a new disaster database called ifo GAME Data. 
Their measures are purely based on the physical intensities of disasters making them 
exogenous to the economic condition of a country. We use GAME data as an alternative 
database to check validity of our findings.  
Following McDermott et al. (2014) we construct a binary disaster variable, using various 
thresholds. A binary variable is less subject to potential reverse causality. We do this as 
a robustness check, as with a continuous disaster variable as we can be more precise in 
quantifying disaster effect on private credit. 
Apart from binary disaster variable following Fomby, Ikeda, and Loayza (2013), we 
construct an impact variable which scales to the size of the disaster, but eliminates the 
smallest disasters. This approach reduces the weight of the distribution of disasters from 
being clustered around the very many, very minor disasters. 
Following (Noy, 2009) we weigh our disaster measure in terms of the onset month. There 
is a likelihood for disasters which occurred in earlier months of the year to cause a bigger 
impact in the same year than disasters which occurred in later months. 
We check against omitted variable bias by adding more control variables, such as macro 
stability, magnitude of the government spending, foreign links, which can be expected to 
have an influence on per capita credit. The inclusion of additional control variables is 
done at different stages. Firstly, we add main control variables one by one to the baseline 
model and subsequent to each addition, an interaction term of that control with the disaster 
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variable is included so that their impact on the baseline model can be observed clearly. 
These main control variables are inflation which controls for macroeconomic stability of 
the country, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the trade share which 
reflects the degree of trade openness. Secondly, we control for other factors which seem 
to either stimulate or hinder private credit in connection with disasters, by using simple 
variant models of the baseline specification. Accordingly, we control for financial sector 
regulation using CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) financial sector 
rating, non-life insurance premia volume as a share of GDP, lending interest rate, share 
of resource rent (including rent received on coal, oil gas, iron ore and minerals such as  
gold, silver, copper, etc. but not including rent on forestry) within the GDP, and share of 
forestry rent as a percentage of GDP and net official assistance received as a percentage 
of gross national income.  
Apart from the panel fixed effect regression, different estimators are used, namely, 
ordinary least squares (OLS), quantile regression, and system generalised method of 
moments (GMM); see Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell 
and Bond (1998) and Roodman (2009a and 2009b).  
We measure per capita credit and GDP in constant 2005 US$ and so account for inflation. 
To control for differences in living standards we repeat the analysis using per capita credit 
and GDP measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) constant 2005 US dollars. We also 
rerun the regression using logged credit variable. 
To eliminate any potential cross-sectional dependence given the spatial nature of disaster 
data, we use Driscoll-Kraay errors (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998) as they are robust to general 
forms of spatial dependence. We further explore the impact of different categories of 
natural disasters on private credit and we also run our regression for different 
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geographical regions. Finally, we ascertain the impact of natural disasters on other 
measures which proxy for financial depth, access, efficiency and stability.  
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 Results 
Results of the baseline model are given in Table 2.3. We restrict attention to the marginal 
effect of natural disasters on private credit. Disasters show a significant positive effect on 
contemporaneous credit. However, this positive effect is dampened down by higher 
income. It appears that the disaster-agriculture interaction also yields a negative 
coefficient suggesting that the positive impact of disasters on credit is further mitigated 
by higher share of agriculture in the economy. However, as this interaction is significant 
only at the 10% level, we ignore it for the time being. 
Table 2.3:  Base model 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
Fixed Effects 
  
Disaster (% Population Affected) 35.35** 
 (14.08) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.00*** 
 (0.0172) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 654.0*** 
 (176.3) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -4.669** 
 (1.807) 
Share of Agriculture 15.64** 
 (7.006) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.135* 
 (0.0763) 
Polity2 -1.064 
 (5.273) 
  
Observations 3,189 
Number of Countries 147 
R-squared 0.958 
  
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A zero marginal effect of disasters on credit is seen in a country with an average per capita 
GDP of constant 2005 US$ 1,941 (standard deviation 1,016) per year. Table A.1 in the 
Appendix gives the impact for selected countries, evaluated at the country average over 
time. In a low income country like Burkina Faso, a one percentage point increase in the 
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percentage of population affected by natural disasters will on average increase the 
contemporaneous per capita private credit by $8.332  or 17%3.  However, in a high income 
country like Australia, when the disaster affected percentage of population increases by 
one percentage point, the contemporaneous per capita credit falls by $12.42 or 0.06%. 
Notwithstanding the fact that both countries have similar values for average population 
affected (2.3% and 2.8%, respectively) due to natural disasters, they see a divergent 
impact on private credit. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the impact evaluated using 
2011 figures. 
Figure 2.1:  Nominal effect of natural disasters on per capita credit (using 2011 values) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the absolute change in per capita credit, due to a one percentage point 
increase in the percentage of population affected by disasters in a single year, varies with 
per capita income, evaluated using 2011 data. There are 53 countries (out of 146 shown 
                                                          
2 [35.35-(4.669*ln326)] 
3 (8.33/48*100) 
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in Figure 2.1) with per capita GDP below constant 2005 US$ 1,941 in 2011. As such, 53 
countries lie below the per capita income of the point where the curve crosses the 
horizontal axis in Figure 2.1. The absolute effect is negative for many rich countries. It 
may be due to the fact that rich countries have access to insurance market and cover 
damages with insurance claims rather than getting into debt. Further, in the recovery 
phase after a natural disaster, ordinary debt financed investments might contract, as the 
housing market and hence the mortgage market slows down and as people postpone debt-
financed purchases as they focus on recovery. 
 Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows this effect as a percentage of prevailing per capita 
credit. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows the same on a map4. It appears that when it 
comes to credit, low income countries gain more from disasters compared to their rich 
counterparts.  
 
  
                                                          
4 We used the Stata command spmap by Maurizio Pisati. See https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456812.html 
30 
 
 Robustness Checks 
2.4.1 No Lagged Dependent Variable 
We run the fixed effects estimator without the lagged dependent variable to address any 
concern about attenuation or Nickel bias. As above, we observe a positive effect of 
disasters on per capita private credit, which is moderated by disaster income interaction. 
These results hold also in the presence of control variables. See Table A.3 in the 
Appendix. Explanatory power falls substantially in the absence of the lagged dependent 
variable, as apparent from the R2; recall that credit per capita is a stock variable. 
 
2.4.2 Unit Root 
Instead of using credit per capita in its level as the dependent variable, we use the first 
difference of credit per capita, again with a fixed effects estimator. In the base model, the 
lagged dependent variable is indistinguishable from unity. As shown in Table 2.4, this 
yields results consistent with those above. 
As a next step, we take the first difference of the explanatory variables, except for the 
disaster variable and per capita income. Table A.4  in the Appendix shows the results, 
again consistent with those above. 
 
2.4.3 Medium-Term Effects of Disasters on Credit 
By averaging our annual data over five year and ten year periods, we ascertain the effect 
of disasters on credit in the medium-term. Results for the fixed effects panel estimator 
using five-year and ten-year averages are presented in Table 2.5, and Table A.5 in the 
Appendix, respectively. In addition, to test medium-term dynamic effect of disasters on 
credit, following McDermott et al. (2014) we run models that include up to 7 lags of 
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disaster variable and its interactions with logged per capita GDP and the share of 
agriculture in GDP using annual data. Table 2.6 presents the sum of the resultant 
contemporaneous and lagged effects of disaster and its interaction with income for each 
model. We confine models to include lags only up to 7 as the disaster variable loses 
significance after 5 lags and the disaster-income interaction loses significance after 6 lags. 
It is apparent from the results that the sum of coefficients on the disaster variable increases 
with more lags compared to the base model reflecting persistency of disaster impact on 
credit. Qualitatively, the results are the same regardless of the number of lags included. 
2.4.4 Outliers 
To ensure that results are not driven by potential outliers, we remove observations at the 
top and bottom of the credit and disaster data distributions. Specifically, we remove the 
top and bottom 10% and then 20% of the credit distribution which brings down the range 
to 31 - 21,956 and 78 - 8,696, respectively, from original range of 0.845 - 163,982. With 
respect to disasters, we remove 27 and then 55 observations with highest percentage of 
population affected which brings down the range of disasters to 0 - 56%  and 0 - 38%, 
respectively, from 0 - 118%. We also remove Tsunami year 2004; and 2004 and 2005 
together as the Tsunami took place at Christmas. Table A.6 and Table A.7 in the 
Appendix, and Table 2.7 show the results, which are consistent with those above. 
 
2.4.5 Alternative Database, ifo GAME Data 
We use two alternative disaster indices namely ‘indexla’ and ‘disindexla’ constructed by 
Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014). These indices are clearly exogenous to economic and 
financial development. Indexla is the sum of physical intensity measures of disasters 
happened in a specific country in a specific year weighted by land area of the affected 
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country. Disindexla is further weighted by respective inverse sample standard deviations. 
Table 2.8 shows results of the regressions using these disaster indices. Using the ifo 
GAME disaster data we again find a positive impact of disasters on private credit 
mitigated by higher income, supporting our original findings. 
 
2.4.6 Additional Controls 
As a further robustness check, control variables are included. See Table A.8 and Table 
A.9 in the Appendix. The addition of controls leads to consistent results and so does not 
invalidate the findings above. When controlling for inflation, government expenditure, 
international trade, financial sector rating, non-life insurance, lending interest rate, 
resource rent and forestry rent, the results for the disaster variable and its interaction with 
income do not change. However, the variables of interest lose significance in the presence 
of foreign aid. This may well be because foreign aid increases in response to natural 
disasters. 
 
2.4.7 Alternative Estimators 
We re-estimate the model using system GMM, ordinary least squares (OLS), and quantile 
regressions to test whether they yield consistent results.  
Results of the baseline model using alternative estimation methods are presented in Table 
2.9 (Columns 1-3). The results are consistent across the alternative estimators. Quantile 
regression also yields consistent results at all percentiles; see Table A.10 in the Appendix.  
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Table 2.4:  Change in per capita credit as the dependent variable (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Change in credit per capita  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
              
Disaster 17.28** 25.73** 26.61*** 12.26 21.41* 35.31** 38.22*** 41.61*** 41.05*** 43.16*** 36.53** 36.49** 36.79** 
 (8.14) (10.55) (10.14) (7.82) (11.71) (13.65) (14.01) (14.26) (14.29) (14.74) (14.60) (14.92) (15.23) 
GDP pc (in logs) 647.7** 604.4** 604.7** 712.3*** 716.2*** 652.8*** 654.2*** 659.2*** 658.9*** 708.4*** 710.0*** 701.2*** 701.7*** 
 (289.6) (295.4) (295.6) (178.8) (179.5) (152.7) (153.2) (155.0) (155.0) (170.6) (170.6) (169.4) (169.7) 
Dis * ln GDP pc -2.33** -3.69** -3.85** -1.75 -2.67* -4.66*** -5.04*** -5.38*** -5.33*** -5.52*** -5.60*** -5.59*** -5.48*** 
 (1.18) (1.58) (1.51) (1.15) (1.47) (1.75) (1.78) (1.80) (1.80) (1.85) (1.88) (1.89) (2.05) 
Polity2  -15.45** -15.78**   -0.95 -1.22 -0.88 -0.88 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.89 
  (7.13) (7.25)   (6.04) (6.09) (6.39) (6.40) (6.98) (6.99) (6.96) (6.96) 
Dis * Polity2   0.13    0.11 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 
   (0.11)    (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Agriculture Share     15.08** 15.35** 15.55** 15.60** 16.36** 16.31** 15.86** 15.75** 16.26* 16.31* 
    (6.32) (6.35) (6.58) (6.59) (6.98) (6.96) (7.81) (7.80) (8.30) (8.35) 
Dis * Agriculture     -0.08 -0.14* -0.15* -0.18** -0.19** -0.22** -0.16* -0.16 -0.17** 
     (0.076) (0.076) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.087) (0.085) (0.094) (0.085) 
Inflation        0.0104 0.0103 0.0116 0.0114 0.0101 0.0102 
        (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0196) (0.0197) 
Dis * Inflation         0.012 0.010 0.018 0.018 0.016 
         (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Govt. Expenditure          -9.72 -10.25 -10.26 -10.37 
          (8.77) (8.86) (8.98) (9.00) 
Dis * Govt. Exp.           0.348 0.338 0.395 
           (0.211) (0.209) (0.260) 
Trade Share            1.217 1.244 
            (3.880) (3.912) 
Dis * Trade             -0.017 
             (0.030) 
              
Observations 4,155 3,614 3,614 3,671 3,671 3,189 3,189 3,130 3,130 3,047 3,047 3,041 3,041 
R-squared 0.028 0.059 0.059 0.025 0.025 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 
No. of Countries 176 152 152 170 170 147 147 145 145 145 145 145 145 
              
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to differencing. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5:  Aggregated (five-year) data 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Disaster 727** 839* 1,025** 1,097** 1,086** 1,008** 1,032** 1,207** 1,137** 
 (331) (450) (403) (423) (420) (416) (421) (488) (481) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 4,779* 4,420* 4,522* 4,369* 4,398* 4,553* 4,555* 3,918* 3,874* 
 (2,48) (2,55) (2,59) (2,62) (2,64) (2,58) (2,58) (2,25) (2,24) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -93** -111* -140** -150** -149** -137** -135** -153** -136** 
 (45.85) (65.15) (58.03) (60.58) (60.42) (60.64) (61.23) (68.01) (66.38) 
Polity2  -401*** -434*** -469*** -468*** -504*** -503*** -515*** -515*** 
  (99) (104) (113) (113) (118) (118) (118) (118) 
Disaster * Polity2   14.77** 15.13** 15.36** 12.42* 12.81* 12.85* 11.70 
   (6.81) (7.05) (7.13) (7.29) (7.21) (7.38) (8.07) 
Inflation    0.87** 0.73* 0.74** 0.74** 0.82** 0.85** 
    (0.41) (0.40) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) 
Disaster * Inflation     0.28 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.34 
     (0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.41) (0.39) 
Government Expenditure      205** 208** 178* 170* 
      (84) (89) (92) (93) 
Disaster * Govt. Expenditure       -2.49 -5.99 -2.01 
       (7.15) (8.14) (8.24) 
Trade Share        50.17 51.82 
        (40.20) (41.15) 
Disaster * Trade         -1.22 
         (1.07) 
Observations 830 724 724 708 708 690 690 690 690 
R-squared 0.175 0.226 0.227 0.236 0.236 0.247 0.247 0.260 0.260 
Number of Countries 175 150 150 148 148 148 148 148 148 
          
Notes: Aggregated data in periods, 1979-2008. All models include a constant term, country and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6:  Dynamics of disasters and credit: Cumulative lagged effects (fixed effects) 
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. All models also include other regressors of base model with 
applicable lags of disaster and its interactions. Reported coefficients and t-stats are the summed contemporaneous and lagged effects. Errors clustered at the country level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Dependent variable:  Credit per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 No Lags 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags 4 Lags 5 Lags 6 Lags 7 Lags 
         
Disaster 35.35** 47.69** 74.59** 102.34** 132.49** 118.94** 82.24 47.47 
 (2.51) (2.28) (2.38) (2.19) (2.23) (1.99) (1.33) (0.68) 
Dis * ln GDP pc -4.669** -6.124** -9.118** -12.424** -16.235** -15.461** -12.275* -9.615 
 (-2.58) (-2.42) (-2.54) (-2.38) (-2.47) (-2.38) (-1.86) (-1.31) 
         
Observations 3,189 3,156 3,068 2,976 2,882 2,784 2,684 2,579 
R-squared 0.958 0.957 0.954 0.950 0.947 0.944 0.940 0935 
Countries 147 146 144 144 144 144 144 143 
         
AIC 54890 54339 52870 51332 49764 48086 46400 44613 
BIC 55121 54587 53129 51602 50044 48377 46701 44924 
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Table 2.7:  Models without credit and disaster outliers (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) 
w/o credit bot. & 
top 20% and 
disaster top 55 obs 
w/o credit bot. & top 
20%, yr 2004 and 
disaster top 55 obs 
w/o credit bot. & top 
20%, yrs 2004-05 and 
disaster top 55 obs 
    
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) 23.65*** 28.31*** 27.41*** 
 (8.551) (8.572) (8.418) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.005*** 1.004*** 1.003*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0214) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 277.9*** 285.0*** 282.4*** 
 (54.02) (54.45) (52.25) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -3.137*** -3.853*** -3.791*** 
 (1.112) (1.098) (1.070) 
Share of Agriculture 3.962 4.331* 3.954* 
 (2.552) (2.452) (2.324) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.0692 -0.0524 -0.0262 
 (0.0651) (0.0656) (0.0716) 
Polity2 1.551 1.714 1.623 
 (1.740) (1.808) (1.814) 
    
Observations 1,866 1,786 1,707 
R-squared 0.937 0.938 0.939 
Number of Countries 109 108 108 
    
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, 
country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.8:  Disaster indices from ifo GAME Data 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) 
indexla disindexla 
   
Disaster Index 4,588** 4,931** 
 (1,752) (2,368) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.028*** 1.028*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0128) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 465.2*** 471.3*** 
 (137.9) (140.3) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -438.0** -478.0** 
 (176.0) (236.6) 
Share of Agriculture 11.09 10.84 
 (6.888) (6.951) 
Disaster * Agriculture -83.74 -32.69 
 (54.16) (116.7) 
Polity2 5.362 5.330 
 (6.361) (6.369) 
   
Observations 2,268 2,268 
R-squared 0.970 0.970 
Number of Countries  104 104 
   
Notes: “indexla” disaster index, sum of types weighted by land area and “disindexla” disaster index, sum of types 
weighted by inverse of standard deviations and by land area. Annual data 1979-2010, except where first observation 
lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.9:  Alternative estimation methods with baseline specification 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed Effects OLS System GMM Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors 
     
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) 35.35** 64.27*** 112.5** 35.35*** 
 (14.08) (16.87) (55.59) (11.26) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.000*** 1.027*** 0.960*** 1.000*** 
 (0.0172) (0.00714) (0.0196) (0.0392) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 654.0*** 229.2*** 545.9*** 654.0*** 
 (176.3) (53.77) (178.0) (224.2) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -4.669** -8.013*** -15.22** -4.669*** 
 (1.807) (2.019) (7.083) (1.512) 
Share of Agriculture 15.64** 13.35*** 24.84*** 15.64** 
 (7.006) (3.588) (8.168) (6.289) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.135* -0.341*** -0.449 -0.135** 
 (0.0763) (0.113) (0.475) (0.0534) 
Polity2 -1.064 6.394** 28.89** -1.064 
 (5.273) (2.698) (12.14) (6.811) 
     
Observations 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 
R-squared 0.958 0.992  0.958 
Number of Countries 147  147 147 
Number of Instruments   66  
Arellano-Bond Test AR(1)   0.278  
Arellano-Bond Test AR(2)   0.053  
Arellano-Bond Test AR(3)   0.156  
Arellano-Bond Test AR(4)   0.283  
Hansen Test    0.817  
     
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, 
country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Columns 1-3 robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Column 4 Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 No. of lags used to instrument 
the endogenous disaster variables in system GMM regression limited to 10 starting at lag 3. 
 
2.4.8 Purchasing Power Parity 
All results above use market exchange rates. This may be misleading as this unit of 
measurement does not accurately reflect standards of living. Therefore, we repeat our 
exercise using per capita credit and GDP measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2005 US$ by employing output-based real GDP data from the Penn World 
Tables Version 8.0. We also apply logarithmic transformation to our credit variable. Table 
A.11 in the Appendix shows the results, which are consistent with those above. 
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2.4.9 Cross-sectional Dependence and Geographical Regions 
Given that there might be cross-sectional dependence in disaster data due to spatial nature 
of disasters, we use Driscoll and Kraay (1998) errors to overcome any such issue (Column 
4 of Table 2.9).  Yielded coefficients are precisely identical to the base model’s 
coefficients suggesting that our analysis does not suffer from cross-sectional dependence. 
Splitting the sample by region, we get consistent results only for Asia and East Asia & 
Pacific. See Table A.12 and Table A.13 in the Appendix.  
 
2.4.10  Disaster Subgroups  
The impact of all disasters is dominated by climatic and meteorological disasters (in EM-
DAT’s classification). See Table A.14 in the Appendix.  
We run our baseline specification for different disaster subgroups. As expected from the 
descriptive statistics, results for climatic disasters are very similar to the results for all 
disasters. Our main findings also hold for biological and geophysical disasters. However, 
although we get the same signs above for the variables of interest for hydrological 
disasters, results are insignificant for hydrological and meteorological disasters. See 
Table A.15 in the Appendix. 
As one can argue that biological disasters are completely different from other disasters, 
we re-estimate our baseline specification across alternative estimators after dropping 
biological disasters. As apparent from Table A.16 in the Appendix, results are very 
similar to the original. 
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2.4.11 Binary Disaster Variable  
Following McDermott et al. (2014), we run our baseline fixed effects estimator using a 
binary disaster variable, which is zero for disasters that below a threshold and one for 
disasters above. This restricts the variable of interest to the presence or absence of a 
disaster in a given country year, ignoring for the magnitude of the disaster. By doing this 
we reduce potential endogeneity, as it is unlikely that credit could control the occurrence 
of disasters. The binary disaster variable of course contains much less information than 
the continuous one. 
We use different thresholds to identify severe disasters. The results are consistent results 
with the above with respect to the sign regardless of the threshold. Effects become 
significant for thresholds of 5.5% or higher. See Table A.17 in the Appendix. Without the 
disaster-agriculture interaction, which is never significant, disasters and the income-
disaster interaction are significant at a 1% threshold. See Table A.18 in the Appendix.  
 
2.4.12 Impact Disaster Variable 
We construct a disaster impact dummy variable following Fomby et al. (2013). These do 
not yield results consistent with our baseline specification. However, when the model 
includes only impact variable, lagged credit and logged GDP per capita as controls, the 
sign on the coefficient of impact variable is consistent. See Table A.19 and Table A.20 in 
the Appendix. 
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2.4.13 Weighed Disaster Variable 
Following (Noy, 2009) we weigh our disaster measure in terms of the onset month. With 
weighed disaster data we do not get significant results but signs on the coefficients are 
consistent with those above. It is to be noted that by using formula 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ (12 − 𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶ℎ)/12  for each disaster event, we remove data on a 
substantial number of events which occurred in the month of December, and EM-DAT 
does not report onset month for more than 100 events. See Table A.21 in the Appendix. 
 
2.4.14 Causality 
The use of binary variable does not completely rule out any potential feedback or reverse 
causality. To ensure that we disentangle real causality of current disasters on current 
credit, we carry out a simple test. We repeat our baseline analysis with disasters occurred 
in subsequent years. A disaster that occurs in a future year cannot affect annual credit of 
the current year. As such, we do not expect to observe a significant impact of disaster 
leads on contemporaneous credit.  
Table 2.10 shows the results of this exercise. Disasters occur in the following year 
(Column 2) and the second year (Column 3) do not show a significant impact on current 
credit supporting our original findings.    
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Table 2.10:  Use of disaster leads with baseline specification 
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags and leads. Model includes a constant 
term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) 
Baseline F.Disaster F2.Disaster 
    
Disaster (% Population Affected) 35.35** 24.55 -2.254 
 (14.08) (14.99) (15.65) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.000*** 1.016*** 1.047*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0146) (0.00930) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 654.0*** 517.0*** 310.9*** 
 (176.3) (142.5) (99.03) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -4.669** -3.470* 0.0568 
 (1.807) (1.801) (1.945) 
Share of Agriculture 15.64** 12.62** 8.278 
 (7.006) (6.250) (5.081) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.135* -0.0717 0.0415 
 (0.0763) (0.130) (0.122) 
Polity2 -1.064 0.381 4.546 
 (5.273) (4.858) (4.189) 
    
Observations 3,189 3,076 2,958 
R-squared 0.958 0.959 0.961 
Number of Countries 147 146 143 
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 Alternative Measures of Financial Development 
Private credit represents only the depth of financial institutions. Using our baseline model 
and the fixed effects estimator, we consider alternative indicators of financial 
development. We cannot use all measures suggested by Čihák et al. (2013) because of an 
insufficient number of observations. Most of these data are available only from 2000 or 
2003 onwards.  
It is not possible in any manner to plug all the different measures of financial development 
in our model as they are, given their nature and measurement units. To see the impact of 
natural disasters on various financial development indicators, it is necessary to employ 
proper estimation strategies on relevant variables for appropriate sub-samples with 
respect to space and time. For instance, exploring disaster effects on bank solvency, 
Klomp (2014) limits his sample to highest economic damage causing 170 severe disasters 
and time period from 1995 to 2010 in quantifying the impact of natural disasters on banks’ 
distance to default. 
Thus, it is obvious that all the indicators of financial development would not give rise to 
consistent results in our model. Nevertheless, as apparent from Table A.22 in the 
Appendix, we find strongly consistent results for liquid assets to deposits and short term 
funding (%) which represents financial stability.  
This indicator is the ratio of the value of the liquid assets of banks which can be easily 
convertible to cash, to their total deposits and short term borrowings. Higher value for 
this ratio represents higher liquidity and financial stability as banks are in a position to 
meet their immediate financial obligations without trouble. As in the case for private 
credit, natural disasters significantly increase the liquidity of banks reflecting their ability 
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to meet disaster affected parties’ immediate need for finances.  However, higher per capita 
income moderates this effect as it lessens the need for borrowing.  
As apparent from Table A.23 – Table A.26 in the Appendix, some other financial 
indicators too yield consistent results at least with respect to the signs on the coefficients 
of the variables of interest.  
Table A.23 contains regression results with respect to disaster variable and its interaction 
with income on other indicators which represent financial depth. Financial depth is not a 
financial function itself but a proxy to reflect the magnitude of overall services extended 
by the financial system (Čihák et al., 2012, p. 8). Deposit money bank’s assets as 
percentage of GDP (gfdd_di_02) appears to increase with contemporaneous disasters but 
decrease when income is high. This is obvious as credit disbursed by banks constitutes 
part of banks’ assets. Nonetheless, this is not true when it comes to assets of non-bank 
financial institutions (gfdd_di_03) that do not accept transferable (demand) deposits as 
apparent from negative sign on the disaster coefficient.  Natural disasters seem to increase 
demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
as a share of GDP (gfdd_di_08). This can be the case as banks can attract more deposits 
by offering a higher interest rate to finance their disaster related credit which can be 
offered at even higher rate to desperate parties at the receiving end. Volumes of life and 
non-life insurance premium (gfdd_di_09 and gfdd_di_10) are reduced by natural 
disasters. Insurers may be reluctant to accept risks in the presence of contemporaneous 
disasters. Further, it is to be noted that insurance penetration is lower in poor countries 
which are more prone to disasters. Stock market capitalisation as represented by total 
value of all listed shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP 
(gfdd_dm_01) tends to decrease with natural disasters indicating adverse impact of such 
events on corporate sector. Nevertheless, increased total value of all traded shares in a 
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stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP (gfdd_dm_02) due to natural disasters 
may be an indicator of shareholders’ attempt to recover financial needs through disposal 
of shares, or reflect investors’ worries about profits and dividends. Outstanding domestic 
private and public debt securities as a percentage to GDP (gfdd_dm_03 and gfdd_dm_04) 
significantly decrease with natural disasters and more so when the income is low. Bond 
holders may be resorting to early redemption to finance disaster recovery as and when 
needed. A puttable bond vests the right upon holder to force the issuer to repay the bond 
prematurely. Total value of outstanding international debt issues both public and private, 
as a share of GDP (gfdd_dm_07) would be likely to decline as the credit rating of a 
country rapidly deteriorate after a natural disaster.  
When financial access is considered, number of bank accounts per 1,000 adults 
(gfdd_ai_01) and number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults (gfdd_ai_02) 
tend to rise in the presence of natural disasters (see Table A.24). This reflects the positive 
response from both demand and supply side after a natural disaster as financial inclusion 
should be expanded to reach disaster recovery related financial requirements. In line with 
the impact of natural disasters on stock market as mentioned afore value of all traded 
shares outside of the largest ten traded companies as a share of total value of all traded 
shares in a stock market exchange (gfdd_am_01) tend to increase whilst value of listed 
shares outside of the ten largest companies to the total value of all listed shares 
(gfdd_am_02) tend to decrease with natural disasters owing to similar reasoning. Total 
amount of domestic non-financial corporate bonds and notes outstanding to total amount 
of domestic bonds and notes outstanding, both corporate and non-corporate 
(gfdd_am_03) seems to increase with disasters, maybe highlighting the active role played 
by the corporate sector over the non-corporate sector by raising liquid funds to finance 
disaster recoveries.   
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Regression results of indicators for financial efficiency are summarised in Table A.25. 
We observe an increase in the accounting value of bank’s net interest revenue as a share 
of its average interest bearing assets (gfdd_ei_01), the difference between lending rate 
charge by banks on loans to the private sector and the deposit interest rate offered by 
commercial banks on deposits with three-month tenure (gfdd_ei_02) and bank’s income 
that has been generated by non-interest related activities such as trading gains, fees, 
commissions and other operating income as a percentage of total income (gfdd_ei_03) 
because increased disaster related credit raises interest income, interest differential as well 
as fees, commission and other activity income including valuation and evaluation income.  
Operating expenses of a bank as a share of the all assets held (gfdd_ei_04) decreases as 
it can be assumed that banks operate with existing administrative resources in handling 
higher demand for disaster related credit whilst increased credit expands the asset base. 
Maybe for the same reason, commercial banks’ after-tax net income to yearly averaged 
total assets (gfdd_ei_05) appears to decline. However, as natural disasters do not 
necessarily increase equity of banks in the manner they increase interest and other 
income, commercial banks’ after-tax net income to yearly averaged equity (gfdd_ei_06) 
increases. Since this impact does not depend on income tax, we observe a similar reaction 
with respect to commercial banks’ pre-tax income to yearly averaged total assets 
(gfdd_ei_09) and commercial banks’ pre-tax income to yearly average equity 
(gfdd_ei_10). Total value of shares during the period divided by the average market 
capitalisation for the period (gfdd_em_01) increases, maybe due to increased trading and 
reduced capitalisation, as stated earlier.  
When it comes to financial stability (see Table A.26), bank Z-score which captures the 
distance to default of a country’s commercial banking system (gfdd_si_01) decreases 
with disasters. Following Klomp (2014), we take the logarithm of this ratio of return-on-
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assets plus equity-asset ratio to standard deviation of return-on-assets. Supporting his 
findings we also see that disasters increase the likelihood of bank defaults weakening 
financial system stability. Ratio of gross value of defaulting loans (repayments of interest 
and principal past due by 90 days or more) to gross loans (gfdd_si_02) also reduces with 
disasters characterising a healthy financial system. Ratio of bank capital and reserves to 
total financial and non-financial assets (gfdd_si_03) increases with natural disasters.  It is 
puzzling as to why the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic 
money banks as a share of total deposits (gfdd_si_04) decline when we observe an 
increase in the private credit. Maybe banks attracting more deposits than the disbursed 
credit as now they are in a position to offer a higher deposit interest rate. The ratio of total 
bank regulatory capital to its assets held, weighted according to risk of those assets 
(gfdd_si_05) increases with disasters. Again it is surprising that the provisions to non-
performing loans (gfdd_si_07) increase in a scenario of observable decline in non-
performing loans. It is rational to see an increase in stock price volatility (gfdd_sm_01) 
i.e., the average of the 360-day volatility of the national stock market index as natural 
disasters unambiguously create an uncertainty in the stock market in the short run.     
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 Conclusion 
This paper shows that natural disasters have a significant positive impact on financial 
development, more specifically on the per capita private credit disbursed by domestic 
banks. This effect is dampened by higher per capita income. The positive impact of 
natural disasters on private credit is further mitigated by higher agricultural dependency 
of the economy. In other words, we find strong evidence that companies and households 
get deeper into debt after a natural disaster. This effect is stronger in poorer countries. We 
find some evidence that suggests that the effect is weaker in countries where agriculture 
is more important.  
Nominal change in per capita credit due to an increase in the disaster measure diminishes 
with higher income.  As the percentage of population affected by disasters increases, poor 
countries with lower per capita income will see an increase in their nominal per capita 
credit, however, rich countries with higher per capita income will experience a decline in 
their nominal per capita credit. Nevertheless, given that the magnitude of the per capita 
credit countries already enjoy differs considerably across countries irrespective of their 
per capita income, the real impact on credit relies upon the prevailing per capita credit. 
So, we would conclude that the impact of natural disasters on financial development 
proxied by credit is country specific as well as time specific.  
Our findings are robust to various checks. We get consistent results when we include 
controls which represent macroeconomic stability, government spending, and trade 
openness enhancing our baseline specification. Once we control for other relevant factors 
such as non-life insurance penetration, financial sector regulation, lending interest rate, 
resource rent and foreign aid while employing baseline model and its slight variants, we 
yet observe consistent results. Our findings are also robust to alternative estimators. We 
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take various measures to rule out any potential endogeneity issue including the use of 
system GMM estimator and binary disaster variable. Further, using the ifo GAME 
disaster data we again find a positive impact of disasters on private credit mitigated by 
higher income, supporting our original findings. Furthermore, we consider alternative 
indicators of financial development, and find that, qualitatively, our results carry over. 
Private credit is only one dimension of financial development, but our results for other 
indicators suggest that natural disasters have a broader impact on financial development. 
Further, as poor countries are more vulnerable to disasters and their financial markets are 
less well developed, the role played by formal credit in disaster consequences would be 
small. The immediate impact of natural disasters is better interpreted as households 
getting (further) into debt rather than as financial development, but we find longer term 
impacts too that indicate an expansion of credit availability. 
With our findings, we hope that relevant policy makers in disaster vulnerable countries 
would take well informed and well thought decisions with respect to financial inclusion, 
domestic bank lending, direct credit and related matters in order to enhance financial 
development. 
Any research comes with caveats which should be explored in further analysis. Two stand 
out. First, we use nationally aggregate data. Changes at the aggregate level are open to 
misinterpretation and may obscure the actual mechanisms. The analysis here should 
therefore be repeated with microdata. Second, we find that natural disasters affect 
financial development. Earlier papers found that financial development affects 
vulnerability to natural disasters. Our analysis should therefore be repeated with a 
dynamic model of simultaneous equations. These issues are deferred to future research. 
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3 Foreign Aid Concentration and Natural 
Disasters 
 Introduction 
Natural disasters attract foreign aid. The focus of this paper is the impact of natural 
disasters on the aid concentration of recipient countries. The paper shows that natural 
disasters lead to a diversification of aid received, in terms of both the number of donors 
contributing and the types of aid received. This is true in the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster, and continues long after. The literature on the fragmentation of aid shows that, 
typically, aid is less effective in promoting economic development when it comes from 
many sources and is spread over many programmes (Gehring, Michaelowa, Dreher, & 
Spörri, 2017; Kimura, Mori, & Sawada, 2012; Oh & Kim, 2015; Sumner & Glennie, 
2015). The paper thus shows that, besides the negative effect of natural disasters on 
economic growth, natural disasters also have a negative impact on development aid. As 
far as we know, no one has explored the impact of natural disasters on aid concentration 
of aid recipient countries with respect to their aid portfolio/donor base before, thus, this 
study allows us to bridge a gap present in the current literature. 
As Yang (2008) shows disasters increase foreign aid considerably and poorer countries 
could cover approximately three fourths of disaster damages due to hurricanes through 
foreign aid from public sources alone. There is a plethora of studies to support the fact 
that natural disasters increase the magnitude of foreign aid received by affected countries 
owing to various donor motives (Becerra et al., 2014, 2015; Wei et al., 2014; Wood & 
Wright, 2016). It is also well established that there is a higher probability for disaster 
affected countries to receive more foreign aid when the disaster news coverage is wide 
and when the disaster affected countries have close connections (historical, political, 
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cultural or religious, etc.) with potential donors prior to the disaster (Olsen, Carstensen, 
& Høyen, 2003; Strömberg, 2007). When disasters occur, the affected countries become 
the centre of international media attention. This news coverage helps affected countries 
to reach priority lists of potential foreign aid donors. Disasters create a platform for 
politicians, activist groups and affected parties to lobby their appeals for aid and to raise 
awareness of their development needs among potential donor entities. Through this 
awareness, disasters ultimately become an indirect determinant of donor future allocation 
decisions. As a result, disasters attract more donors and also aid meant for development 
purposes other than disaster related matters leading to a reduction in aid concentration in 
recipient countries.  
The existing literature also discusses the determinants of post natural disaster aid 
allocations across space and time. Specifically, using an event study analysis approach of 
post disaster aid-surges, Becerra et al. (2014) whilst arguing that aid-surges cover only 
3% of the estimated damages due to natural disasters (despite the median increase in ODA 
by 18% compares to pre disaster flows), identify disaster intensity and country 
characteristics such as level of development, country size and magnitude of foreign 
reserves as key determinants of post disaster aid-surges. 
It is obvious that natural disasters enhance aid aimed at emergency and disaster relief, and 
perhaps preparedness too. This aid supposedly facilitates speedy and smooth recovery 
and reconstruction after natural disasters.  There is evidence also to suggest that past 
foreign aid flows suppress the political willingness to invest on disaster prevention and 
mitigation intentions (Raschky & Schwindt, 2016). It is also to be noted that Becerra et 
al. (2015) present some evidence of cross-sectorial substitution where donors sometime 
decrease aid aimed at other sectors in order to increase humanitarian aid given to the same 
recipient. 
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Constructing a Herfindahl-Hirschman index for donor concentration, which acts as a 
proxy for aid proliferation in recipient countries, Kimura et al. (2012) find that aid 
proliferation negatively affects economic growth, especially in Africa. As Aldasoro, 
Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2010) point out, aid proliferation, donor fragmentation and the 
lack of coordination have been widely identified as serious problems for  aid 
effectiveness. Oh and Kim (2015) also find that donor proliferation is harmful to the 
recipient’s growth in the long run. Gehring et al. (2017) present evidence to confirm 
negative effect of fragmentation on aid effectiveness in terms of economic growth.  
Acharya, De Lima, and Moore (2006) show that aid proliferation and fragmentation cause 
unacceptably high direct and indirect transaction costs on many recipient countries. 
In this paper, we examine the impact of natural disasters on concentration of foreign aid 
categories and donor base of aid recipient countries. The expansion in aid portfolio 
materialises through more diversified categories (beyond disaster related categories) 
under which aid recipients receive charitable receipts. Donor base expands when the 
number of donor entities from whom a recipient receives donations is increased. The 
analysis uses a cross country panel data set covering the period from 1979 to 2010. 
Employed disaster indices are purely based on physical intensities of disasters, thus 
overcome common issue of endogeneity in natural disaster data. Findings suggest that 
natural disasters attract not only aid aimed at emergency, disaster relief and preparedness 
but also foreign aid under multiple other development categories such as education, 
healthcare, environmental protection, natural recourses, forestry, technology, industry, 
construction, energy, agriculture, social welfare, water, transportation, trade, political 
stability and financial development. As such, natural disasters expand recipient aid 
portfolio with respect to categories under which they receive foreign aid. Not only that, 
natural disasters increase the number of donors who donate aid to a recipient country 
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reducing recipient’s dependence on a single donor. So, this is an expansion in the recipient 
aid donor base / network in terms of number of donors. Further, natural disasters also 
reduce aid concentration with respect to aid categories and donors as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces data and the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 discusses results followed by robustness checks in section 4. 
Concluding section 5 discusses findings and policy implications of the study. It also 
points out limitations of the paper whilst suggesting potential avenues for further research 
in the future.  
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 Empirical Analysis 
3.2.1 Data 
The source of foreign aid data for this study is the international aid data provided by 
AidData’s Research Release 2.1 (Tierney et al., 2011). AidData is a project of the 
partnership among Brigham Young University, the College of William and Mary, and 
Development Gateway. “AidData defines development finance to include not only 
traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) but also loans or grants from 
governments, official government aid agencies, and inter-governmental organisations 
intended mainly to promote the economic development and welfare (broadly defined) of 
developing countries…” (Tierney et al., 2011, p. 1892). However, AidData does not 
include funding from nongovernmental organisations, private investors, banks or 
foundations and military assistance. AidData covers information on development finance 
activities from 1946 - 2013. Aid Data has augmented the OECD Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS) database with more data gathered from donor annual reports, project 
documents from both bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, donor agency sources, and 
agency websites and databases. 
The amount of aid used in this analysis is the commitment amount (in constant 2009 
USD) the donor (donor country or the multilateral organisation) has agreed to provide for 
the duration of the project, often disbursed over the following years. AidData has 
developed a five digit coding system to identify the sector and purpose of the project. We 
use these codes to classify aid categories.  
Other economic indicators and natural disaster data are taken from the ifo GAME data 
(Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014). Natural disaster data are generally subject to criticism 
over the potential endogeneity issues as measures of natural disaster outcomes are often 
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affected by socio and economic conditions of affected areas. Natural disaster data of ifo 
GAME data are unique in the sense that they have been constructed purely based on the 
physical intensities of disasters so that the measures have entirely overcome the 
endogeneity problem.    
The ifo GAME data presents two aggregated natural disaster indices, namely ‘disindexla’ 
(disaster index 1) and ‘indexla’ (disaster index 2). To compile these disaster indices 
physical intensity data of earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, storms, floods, droughts and 
extreme temperature events have been extracted from primary geophysical and 
meteorological databases.  The physical intensity measure used for earthquakes is the 
maximum realisation value on the Richter scale within a single earthquake episode. The 
highest recorded Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) during a volcanic eruption has been 
used for volcanic intensity. The maximum total wind speed in knots on a country basis 
reflects storm intensity. Floods are measured as the positive difference in total monthly 
precipitation whilst droughts take value unity in an indicator variable if the rainfall is 
below 50% of the long-run monthly mean at least for three consecutive months or five 
months within a year, and zero otherwise (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014, pp. 94-95). All 
the disaster measures are aggregated into an overall composite disaster index. 
Composite disaster indices, ‘indexla’ and ‘disindexla’ are the sum of physical intensity 
measures of different types of disasters occurred in a given country in a given year. Both 
indices are weighted by log area of that country appreciating the fact that economic effects 
of disasters vary with the extent of a country. ‘Disindexla’ is further weighted by 
respective inverse sample standard deviations. Use of the inverse of the standard deviation 
of a disaster type within a country over all years rules out the dominance movement of 
disaster index by any single disaster component (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014, p. 98).  
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Disaster index ‘indexla’ is created using an unweighted sum of disaster intensity measure 
after scaling for all respective disaster variables by land area. However, ‘disindexla’ 
further uses the inverse of the standard deviation of a disaster type within a country over 
all years as precision weights. Therefore, no single disaster component dominates the 
movement of the disaster index, ‘disindexla’. For this reason, ‘disindexla’ appears to be 
a better index to represent natural disasters over ‘indexla’. As such, more refined disaster 
index, ‘disindexla’ is used in this analysis. 
In our analysis, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (Hirschman, 1964) is employed 
to measure foreign aid concentration. The index which uses following formula varies 
between 0 and 1.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗2𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1
 
 
where 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index which measures aid concentration in 
country i for year t,  𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 is the share of donations received under category j or from donor 
j, and N is the number of categories or donors. An index value of one for the HHI which 
is constructed based on categories under which foreign aid is received by recipient 
countries (HHI categories), represents a perfectly concentrated aid portfolio where the 
recipient receives entire foreign aid under one category. An index value close to zero 
represents an extremely diversified aid portfolio where the recipient receives a good 
spread of foreign aid under many more categories.  
An index value of one for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index which is constructed based on 
donors from whom recipients receive foreign aid (HHI donors) indicates a perfectly 
(3.1) 
56 
 
 
 
concentrated aid network where all the aid is received from the same donor. A value close 
to zero indicates donor diversification where single donor dependence is much less.  
Table 3.1: Summary statistics (post estimation) 
      Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Aid Cat. (HHI categories) 2,425 0.2804 0.2031 0.0794 1 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for Donors (HHI donors) 2,183 0.3176 0.2302 0.0606 1 
Disaster Index 1 (disindexla) 2,425 0.0317 0.1756 6.63e-06 2.228 
Disaster Index 2 (indexla) 2,425 0.0323 0.1745 1.06E-06 2.155 
GDP per capita, PPP (in logs) 2,183        7.847  1.127         5.491  11.238 
Polity Index of Polity IV Project 2,183 0.582 0.333 0 1 
Domestic Credit by Banking Sector (% of GDP) 2,183 0.460 0.377 -0.730 2.489 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 2,183 -0.031 0.081 -0.448 0.446 
Population ( in logs) 2,183       9.485   1.456          6.915  14.096 
No. of Aid Categories 2,183 14 4 1 18 
No. of Donors 2,183 19 10 1 47 
Total Amount, Aid Received (in constant 2009 US$) 2,425 1.53E+09 3.00E+09 1811.3 5.87E+10 
      
        
Post estimation summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are shown in 
Table 3.1. On average, Herfindahl-Hirschman index for aid categories (HHI categories) is 
around 0.28 and Herfindahl-Hirschman index for donors (HHI donors) is around 0.32 
reflecting a moderately concentrated foreign aid portfolio / network. Disaster indices, 
‘disindexla’ and ‘indexla’ take mean values of 0.0317 and 0.0323, respectively. Summary 
statistics of disaster indices ‘disindexla’ and ‘indexla’ are very similar. The reason for 
this is that these measures have been further scaled so that they admit the same mean to 
facilitate comparison (Felbermayr & Gröschl, 2014, p. 98). Countries receive aid from 19 
donor entities on average in a country year.  The minimum number of donors per country 
is 1 whilst the maximum number can be as high as 47. Meanwhile, they receive aid under 
14 different categories, on average and the number of categories can vary between 1 and 
18. These eighteen categories are emergency and disaster relief and preparedness; 
environmental protection; mining, metals and mineral resources; forestry; technology; 
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industry; construction, real estate and urban planning; healthcare; education; energy; 
agriculture, livestock, food and fishing; social welfare; water; transportation; trade, 
economic and business policy; political; financial; and unclassifiable.   
Figure 3.1 presents the variation of average aid per capita and average Herfindahl-
Hirschman index for aid categories (HHI categories) across countries. Figure 3.2 shows the 
variation of aid concentration measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index for aid 
categories (HHI categories) by countries over time.
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Figure 3.1:  Variation of aid across countries 
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Figure 3.2: Variation of aid concentration measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index for aid categories (HHI categories) by countries over time 
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AGO Angola 
ALB Albania 
ARG Argentina 
ARM Armenia 
AUS Australia 
AZE Azerbaijan 
BDI Burundi 
BEL Belgium 
BFA Burkina Faso 
BGD Bangladesh 
BGR Bulgaria 
BLR Belarus 
BOL Bolivia 
BRA Brazil 
BWA Botswana 
CAN Canada 
CHE Switzerland 
CHN China 
CIV Cote D'Ivoire 
CMR Cameroon 
COG Congo, Rep. 
COL Colombia 
CRI Costa Rica 
CZE Czech Republic 
DEU Germany 
DNK Denmark 
DOM Dominican Republic 
DZA Algeria 
ECU Ecuador 
EGY Egypt 
ESP Spain 
ETH Ethiopia 
FIN Finland 
FRA France 
GAB Gabon 
GBR United Kingdom 
GRC Greece 
GTM Guatemala 
HND Honduras 
HRV Croatia 
HTI Haiti 
HUN Hungary 
IDN Indonesia 
IND India 
IRL Ireland 
ISR Israel 
JOR Jordan 
JPN Japan 
KEN Kenya 
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 
KOR Korea 
KWT Kuwait 
LAO Laos 
LBR Liberia 
LKA Sri Lanka 
MAR Morocco 
MDG Madagascar 
MEX Mexico 
MKD Macedonia, FYR 
MLI Mali 
MNG Mongolia 
MOZ Mozambique 
MRT Mauritania 
MYS Malaysia 
NAM Namibia 
NER Niger 
NIC Nicaragua 
NLD Netherlands 
NOR Norway 
NPL Nepal 
NZL New Zealand 
OMN Oman 
PAK Pakistan 
PAN Panama 
PER Peru 
PHL Philippines 
PNG Papua New Guinea 
POL Poland 
PRT Portugal 
PRY Paraguay 
ROM Romania 
RUS Russia 
RWA Rwanda 
SEN Senegal 
SGP Singapore 
SLV El Salvador 
SRB Serbia 
SVK Slovak Republic 
SVN Slovenia 
SYR Syria 
TCD Chad 
TGO Togo 
THA Thailand 
TJK Tajikistan 
TTO Trinidad & Tobago 
TUN Tunisia 
TZA Tanzania 
UGA Uganda 
UKR Ukraine 
URY Uruguay 
USA United States 
VNM Vietnam 
YEM Yemen 
ZAF South Africa 
ZMB Zambia 
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3.2.2 Empirical Model 
We employ a panel regression estimator with country and year fixed effects as the main 
estimation tool in our analysis. The fixed effects estimator with time dummies takes care 
of country specific characteristics that do not change over time (unobservable 
heterogeneity) and time-variant shocks common to all countries.  
The panel regression equation of the most parsimonious model is as follows; 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (3.2)  
where AidConcentration,  the foreign aid concentration as measured by Herfindahl-
Hirschman index in country i for year t, is the dependent variable. This measure is based 
on the categories under which recipient countries receive foreign aid. Dis is our disaster 
index, ‘disindexla’ taken from the ifo GAME database. It is the sum of physical intensity 
measures of all natural disasters occurred in a specific country in a specific year weighted 
by land area of the affected country and respective sample standard deviations. This 
disaster measure is purely based on physical strengths of disasters. As such, it is expected 
to rule out in entirety, the potential endogeneity problem of disaster measure being 
affected by other economic indicators of the affected country.  
It takes time for natural disasters to attract foreign aid, specifically aid aimed at other 
development categories rather than disaster related purposes. Further, disasters can occur 
at any time of the calendar year. Having considered these, lagged disaster index is 
included in the equation instead of the contemporaneous disaster index.  
Terms 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 are the country and year fixed effects included in the model, respectively. 
The final term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in the equation is the error term. As natural disasters are not evenly 
62 
 
 
 
 
distributed across countries, robust standard errors are clustered at country level. 
However, when clustered even at regional level considering potential spatial dependence, 
results do not change. 
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 Results 
Results of the baseline model are given in Table 3.2. We find statistically significant 
negative impact of natural disasters that occurred in the previous year on the recipient 
foreign aid category concentration as measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Disaster 
index1, disindexla is the sum of physical intensity measures of disasters took place in a 
specific country year weighted by the land area of that country and by respective inverse 
sample standard deviations.  
Table 3.2: Results for regressing foreign aid concentration on natural disasters: Base 
model 
 Dependent variable: Aid concentration (HHI categories) 
Fixed Effects 
  
Lagged Disaster Index 1 (disindexla) -0.237*** 
 (0.0498) 
  
Observations 2,425 
Number of Countries 95 
R-squared 0.032 
  
Notes: Annual data 1979-2010, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Following Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014), we quantify the marginal aid concentration 
impact of disasters at different intensities. According to the results, in a year in which the 
disaster index is equal to the sample mean of 0.0317, aid concentration as measured by 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index is lower by about 0.0075 index points5; a one standard 
deviation increase of disaster index above the mean reduces aid concentration by about 
0.0491 Herfindahl-Hirschman index points6. Hence, with disasters, the categories under 
which countries receive foreign aid would expand reducing aid concentration.  It is 
                                                          
5 -0.237*0.0317 
6 -0.237*(0.0317+0.1756) 
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obvious that disasters have a positive impact on disaster related aid as disasters attract aid 
aimed at disaster-connected matters. However, it appears that disasters increase not only 
disaster related aid but also other kinds of charitable receipts which would in turn affect 
the economic development of the recipient-country as per the existing literature. 
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 Robustness Checks 
3.4.1  Without “Emergency and disaster relief and preparedness” Category 
Our aid categories include the aid category related to natural disasters, i.e. “emergency 
and disaster relief and preparedness” category. To ensure that the results are not driven 
by this category, we re-estimate our base model with Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
calculated excluding this category. As apparent from results contained in Table 3.3 which 
are strongly consistent with of the base model, this exercise does not make any difference 
to the original findings.  
Table 3.3: Results for regressing foreign aid concentration excluding “emergency and 
disaster relief and preparedness” category on natural disasters: Base model 
 Dependent variable: Aid concentration (HHI categories)   
excluding disaster related aid category 
Fixed Effects 
  
Lagged Disaster Index 1 (disindexla) -0.237*** 
 (0.0490) 
  
Observations 2,423 
Number of Countries 94 
R-squared 0.034 
  
Notes: Annual data 1979-2010, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.4.2 Contemporaneous Disasters and Second Lag of Disasters 
We have used lagged disaster variable in our base model for the reasons set out under 
‘Empirical Model’. As a further robustness check, we include contemporaneous disasters 
and a further lag of disasters to check how the model performs in the presence of these 
variables. Results are presented in Table 3.4. The impact of first lag of disasters does not 
dissipate once contemporaneous disasters and a further lag of disasters are included. 
Further, we cannot observe a statistically significant impact of contemporaneous disasters 
66 
 
 
 
 
on the aid concentration, confirming the lagged effect of disasters on aid concentration.  
 
Table 3.4: Results for regressing foreign aid concentration on natural disasters:
 Contemporaneous Disasters and Second Lag of Disasters (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Aid concentration (HHI categories) 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Disaster Index 1 (disindexla)  -0.0324 0.0649 
  (0.0858) (0.120) 
L. Disaster Index 1 (disindexla) -0.237*** -0.222*** -0.0982** 
 (0.0498) (0.0252) (0.0391) 
L2. Disaster Index 1 (disindexla)   -0.391*** 
   (0.108) 
    
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,315 
R-squared 0.032 0.032 0.034 
Number of Countries 95 95 92 
    
Notes: Annual data 1979-2010, except where observations lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.4.3 Additional Controls 
We gradually add more control variables to our very parsimonious base model to check 
the sensitivity of results. Control variables are added sequentially for easy perusal of their 
effect. As we can imagine income level as a determinant of aid concentration, we add 
logged gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (measured in constant purchasing power 
parity dollars) to the regression. As the political regime of a country plays a role in the 
aid attracted by that country, acknowledging that most foreign aid is politically 
influenced, the Polity index of Polity IV Project is added to the regression. As domestic 
credit disbursed by banking sector as a percentage of GDP indicates the availability of 
recovery finances and also the level of financial development of the country, credit 
variable is included in the regression. The dummy variable to the effect whether the 
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country is a member country of OECD also reflects the close ties it has with big donors. 
Current account balance as percentage of GDP and population variables are also included 
in the regression equation as additional controls. Considering the time lag it takes for the 
influence of these controls to be fed into aid concentration, lagged terms of control 
variables are included in the regression. 
As apparent from Table 3.5, the earlier results hold in the presence of other control 
variables, namely, per capita income, polity, domestic credit availability, being an OECD 
country, current account balance and population. So, even in the presence of these 
controls, disasters diversify aid with respect to aid categories. 
 
3.4.4 Alternative Estimators 
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate the model with controls using ordinary least 
squares (OLS), difference and system generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimators; see Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond 
(1998) and (Roodman, 2009b). Results are presented in Table 3.6. All the alternative 
estimators yield statistically significant negative impact of natural disasters on foreign aid 
concentration. 
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Table 3.5: Results for regressing foreign aid concentration on natural disasters: Controls (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Aid concentration (HHI categories) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Lagged Disaster Index 1 (disindexla) -0.225*** -0.216*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.227*** -0.234*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0518) (0.0504) (0.0505) (0.0571) (0.0565) 
Lagged GDP per capita (logged) 0.0273 0.0187 0.0411 0.0408 0.0609 0.0522 
 (0.0392) (0.0418) (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0410) (0.0424) 
Lagged Polity Index  -0.0642 -0.0351 -0.0361 -0.0313 -0.0329 
  (0.0386) (0.0328) (0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0331) 
Lagged Credit (% of GDP)   0.0810** 0.0815** 0.0623* 0.0603* 
   (0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0347) (0.0342) 
Lagged OECD Dummy    0.0127 0.00816 -0.00194 
    (0.0511) (0.0524) (0.0531) 
Lagged Current Account Balance  (% of GDP)     -0.100 -0.0961 
     (0.0753) (0.0743) 
Lagged Population (in logs)      -0.0585 
      (0.0766) 
       
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,282 2,282 2,183 2,183 
R-squared 0.033 0.038 0.045 0.046 0.045 0.046 
Number of Countries 95 95 94 94 94 94 
       
Notes: Annual data 1979-2010, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Results for regressing aid concentration on natural disasters: Alternative estimators  
 Dependent variable: Aid concentration (HHI categories) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FE OLS Difference GMM System GMM 
     
Lagged Disaster Index 1 (disindexla) -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.430*** -0.355*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0577) (0.103) (0.126) 
Lagged GDP per capita (logged) 0.0522 0.0522 0.0857 0.160 
 (0.0424) (0.0434) (0.178) (0.111) 
Lagged Polity Index -0.0329 -0.0329 0.00674 -0.0209 
 (0.0331) (0.0338) (0.100) (0.0783) 
Lagged Credit (% of GDP) 0.0603* 0.0603* 0.0910 0.218** 
 (0.0342) (0.0350) (0.0890) (0.0994) 
Lagged OECD Dummy -0.00194 -0.00194 -0.524 0.740** 
 (0.0531) (0.0543) (0.333) (0.365) 
Lagged Current Account Balance (% GDP) -0.0961 -0.0961 0.199 0.174 
 (0.0743) (0.0760) (0.148) (0.133) 
Lagged Population (in logs) -0.0585 -0.0585 -0.994*** -0.104 
 (0.0766) (0.0783) (0.278) (0.0745) 
     
Observations 2,183 2,183 2,065 2,183 
R-squared 0.046 0.544   
Number of Countries 94  92 94 
Number of Instruments    85 91 
Arellano-Bond test AR(1)   0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test AR(2)   0.319 0.134 
Hansen Test    0.683 0.551 
     
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 No. of lags used to instrument the endogenous variables in difference and system GMM regressions limited to 10 starting at lag 2.
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3.4.5 Alternative Aid Measures 
Apart from Herfindahl-Hirschman index, we use other indicators which represent aid 
diversity as the dependent variable. The results of these models are given in Table 3.7. 
Natural disasters as measured by disaster index, ‘disindexla’, have a statistically 
significant positive impact on the number of aid categories under which recipients receive 
foreign aid (Column 1 of Table 3.7). This indicates an enhancement in the diversification 
of the recipient aid portfolios. Natural disasters also significantly increase the number of 
donor entities donating to a given recipient (Column 2 of Table 3.7). This reflects an 
enhancement in the diversification across aid sources, i.e., donors. Natural disasters also 
reduce the dependence of a single donor as reflected by the negative effect of the disaster 
index on Herfindahl-Hirschman index of donors (Column 3 of Table 3.7). Thus, disasters 
expand the aid donor network of recipient countries enabling disaster prone countries to 
attract more aid inflows. When we use total amount of aid received by a recipient (in 
constant 2009 US$) as the dependent variable, the sign on the yielded coefficient is 
positive although it is not statistically significant (Column 4 of Table 3.7). However, 
when we use the other composite disaster index, ‘indexla’ (a less refined disaster measure 
as it has not been weighted by the inverse of the respective sample standard deviations, 
as discussed above) presented by Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014), we can see a 
statistically significant positive impact of natural disasters on total amount of aid (Column 
5 of Table 3.7). 
 
3.4.6 Alternative Disaster Data, EM-DAT International Disaster Database 
As a further robustness check, we use a disaster measure calculated using disaster data 
obtained from EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database (Guha-Sapir et al., 2014) 
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and re-estimate our base model.  In this exercise, disasters are measured as the percentage 
of population affected due to all natural disasters during a country year thus it captures 
humanitarian motives also for foreign aid allocation by donors apart from disaster 
intensity.  Earlier results hold; see Table 3.8. We repeat the analysis using the EM-DAT 
disaster measure constructed excluding biological disasters for better comparison with 
the ifo GAME data disaster indices as these composite physical intensity disaster indices 
do not include biological disasters. Unreported results are almost identical to the ones in 
Table 3.8.
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Table 3.7: Results for regressing foreign aid concentration and other aid measures on natural disasters: Alternative foreign aid measures (fixed 
effects) 
 Dependent variable: Foreign aid measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
No. of Aid Categories No. of Aid Donors Aid Concentration  
(HHI donors ) 
Aid - Total Amount 
(2009 US$) 
Aid - Total Amount 
(2009 US$) 
      
Lagged Disaster Index 1 (disindexla) 5.391*** 9.001*** -0.185*** 2.235e+08  
 (0.429) (1.963) (0.0500) (3.368e+08)  
Lagged Disaster Index 2 (indexla)     5.225e+08** 
     (2.614e+08) 
      
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 
R-squared 0.330 0.745 0.054 0.037 0.037 
Number of Countries 95 95 95 95 95 
      
Notes: Annual data 1979-2010, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8: Results for regressing foreign aid concentration on natural disasters: 
Alternative disaster data, EM-DAT (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Aid concentration  
HHI categories 
  
Lagged % of population affected due to all natural disasters -0.000542* 
 (0.000292) 
  
Observations 4,729 
R-squared 190 
Number of Countries 0.042 
  
Notes: Annual data 1979-2010, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Long-Run Effects 
To test whether the impact of natural disasters on aid concentration extends to long run, 
we repeat our analysis with long differences of independent variables. Accordingly, we 
regress aid concentration on five year differences of independent variables and thereafter 
on ten year differences. We observe statistically significant negative impact of disasters 
on aid concentration on both occasions confirming that the impact is not limited only to 
short run; see Table 3.9.  
 Table 3.9: Results for regressing aid concentration on natural disasters: Long 
differences (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Aid concentration (HHI categories) 
(1) (2) 
5 Years 10 Years 
   
Differenced Disaster Index 1 (disindexla) -0.167*** -0.410*** 
 (0.0250) (0.0471) 
Differenced GDP per capita (logged) -0.0971*** -0.0390 
 (0.0346) (0.0340) 
Differenced Polity Index -0.0234 -0.0436* 
 (0.0279) (0.0234) 
Differenced Credit (% of GDP) 0.0455* 0.0551 
 (0.0246) (0.0375) 
Differenced OECD Dummy -0.0950* -0.196** 
 (0.0481) (0.0900) 
Differenced Current Account Balance (% GDP) 0.181*** 0.116* 
 (0.0617) (0.0674) 
Differenced Population (in logs) -0.263 -0.130 
 (0.162) (0.136) 
   
Observations 1,784 1,356 
R-squared 0.057 0.083 
Number of Countries 93 90 
   
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, 
country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 Discussion and Conclusion 
We explore the impact of natural disasters on foreign aid concentration of aid recipient 
countries. The disaster indices used are purely based on physical intensities of disasters, 
so our study overcomes the common issue of endogeneity in natural disaster data. We 
find that natural disasters increase the number of development categories under which 
recipient countries receive charitable receipts. We also find that natural disasters increase 
the number of donor entities from whom disaster affected countries receive foreign aid. 
Further, natural disasters reduce foreign aid concentration as measured by Herfindahl-
Hirschman index. These results hold in the presence of additional controls such as per 
capita income, trade openness, political regime, domestic credit, foreign direct 
investments, etc. Apart from panel fixed effects estimator, alternative estimators, namely, 
OLS, difference and system GMM also yield consistent results. Results are also robust to 
alternative aid measures, disaster measures and data. Not only short run effects, our study 
also finds evidence of long run disaster impact on foreign aid concentration. 
It can be expected aid aimed at various development objectives such as education, 
healthcare, environmental protection, natural recourses, forestry, technology, industry, 
construction, energy, agriculture, social welfare, water, transportation, trade, political 
stability and financial development to underpin economic development. Aid recipient 
countries are generally developing countries and donors are wealthy entities with higher 
technological advancement. Therefore, it can also be expected that any expansion in the 
donor base of recipient countries to facilitate the economic development of recipient 
countries with a supportive and robust external network. However, existing literature has 
identified aid proliferation as an impediment for economic development in recipient 
countries mainly due to the huge transaction and administrative costs imposed in recipient 
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country’s government and “inefficiency of the overburdened bureaucracy” (Gehring et 
al., 2017, p. 322). 
Accordingly, natural disasters can indirectly affect the development of countries through 
reduced aid concentration. Thus, policy makers in disaster vulnerable countries should be 
aware of the link between natural disasters and aid concentration to take appropriate 
action to transform a destructive calamity into a constructive development effort.  
There is only a limited number of different aid categories and, donors with potential and 
willingness to donate. In addition, disasters are not evenly distributed across countries. 
As such, our study may not represent a universal picture. Further, it does not identify the 
exact mechanisms through which natural disasters influence aid concentration or aid 
concentration affects economic development. Future research can address these issues.  
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4 Impact of Natural Disasters on Income 
Inequality in Sri Lanka 
 Introduction 
Natural disasters disproportionally affect the poor. It is therefore often assumed that 
natural disasters increase income inequality. However, as Karim and Noy (2016) point 
out, there is little research on the impact of natural disasters on income inequality. This 
paper contributes with a study of Sri Lanka.  
In the aftermath of a natural catastrophe, it is essential that affected agents should have 
access to timely and sufficient finances to ensure a smooth and speedy recovery 
(Keerthiratne & Tol, 2017). Wealthy individuals are in a better position to meet this 
financial requirement through self-financing as they can use their savings for 
reconstruction, they are more likely to have bought insurance to cover any losses, and 
they have better access to loans and credit. Not only that, the rich are often better prepared 
for natural disasters as they can financially afford to have precautionary solutions to avoid 
or mitigate disaster damages. Further, the poor are more likely to have irregular income, 
so that every disruption, either due to the disaster directly or dealing with the aftermath, 
means a loss in income. As such, even within the same country, natural disasters would 
differently affect rich and poor individuals. Natural disasters may thus negatively affect 
the level of income of the poor leading to a widened income inequality in society. 
Furthermore, disaster affected territories generally suffer economic damages by way of 
human and physical capital losses which usually cause declines in average incomes. 
Accordingly, this may lead to spatial disparities in average incomes ultimately increasing 
income inequality among individuals within the same economy.  
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As Karim and Noy (2016, p. 4) highlight, it is apparent from the existing literature that 
“poorer households are more vulnerable and will bear the direct damages of disasters 
disproportionally at higher levels and as higher shares of their household’s income” 
compared to rich households (Datt & Hoogeveen, 2003; Kim, 2012; Masozera, Bailey, & 
Kerchner, 2007; Morris et al., 2002; Rodríguez-Oreggia, 2010; Tesliuc & Lindert, 2002; 
Toya & Skidmore, 2007).  
When a disaster strikes, the magnitude of its impact on an economy depends on 
characteristics of disaster itself and the prevailing conditions and socio-economic status 
of the affected territory as a whole. It appears that as a result of a similar natural disaster 
event more vulnerable poor countries suffer to a greater extent as opposed to their well-
prepared wealthy counterparts. Quoting the World Bank, McDermott et al. (2014, p. 751) 
highlight that 97% of deaths related to natural disasters occur in developing countries and 
poor countries experience extremely high economic losses as a share of gross national 
product than rich countries due to natural disasters. 
Whilst arguing that natural disasters cause human and economic losses irrespective of the 
level of economic development countries have achieved, Yamamura (2015) employs 
panel data for 86 countries covering the period from 1970 to 2004 to examine how the 
occurrence of natural disasters has affected the income inequality, as measured by Gini 
coefficient. He finds that natural disasters increase income inequality in the short run, 
however, this is not observable in the long run. 
As Karim and Noy (2016, p. 4) suggest “the direct impact of disasters on the poor (in 
magnitude, and relative to the rich) cannot be answered” fully by merely  “examining the 
cross-country distribution of costs and economic activity…the evidence on the 
distribution of the direct impact of a disaster within a country on households in various 
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income levels is less well understood” as it clearly depends on country characteristics. As 
such, country-level research is warranted in this field. 
Using the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey in 2008, Bui et al. (2014) find that 
natural disasters increased income inequality among households in Vietnam in 2008. 
When natural disasters occur, households can suffer large losses in assets and income. 
However, poor may be more vulnerable to loss of income due to their inability to engage 
in work and the unavoidable sale of income deriving capital assets as a coping strategy. 
If poorer households are less prepared for disasters; the poor live in disaster prone areas 
and homes that are more likely to be damaged; and receive earnings mainly from sectors 
which are more likely to face downturn (e.g., weather dependent traditional agriculture), 
poor would bear higher income losses and natural disasters could cause greater income 
inequality. 
Investigating the impact of Cyclone Aila in Sundarbans region in Bangladesh in 2009, 
Abdullah et al. (2016) establish that income inequality decreased after the cyclone. 
Another very recent paper by Feng et al. (2016) show that household income fell by 14% 
due to 2008 Sichuan earthquake  in China, however, income inequality did not change. 
These findings may be somewhat surprising on the face of it as one would expect natural 
disasters to exacerbate income inequality.  
At subsistence level, people possess little that can be lost to a natural disaster. Losses for 
the wealthier groups would be disproportionately greater due to natural disasters. People 
on a monthly wage would not see their income affected by a disaster, but small business 
owners would. Unskilled day labourers may find new opportunities in the reconstruction 
effort. In other words, the impact of natural disasters on income inequality is ambiguous.   
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Against this background, we study the impact of natural disasters on income inequality 
in Sri Lanka at district level, as the first study of this nature. We find that natural disasters 
decrease income inequality among Sri Lankan households in line with the results of the 
aforesaid two studies on Bangladesh and China. Our data allow us to decompose income 
sources, so that we better understand the mechanisms. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes data and empirical strategy. Results 
are discussed in Section 3 followed by Section 4 which contains robustness checks. 
Section 5 sets out concluding remarks with some policy implications and also recognises 
the limitations of the study. 
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 Empirical Analysis 
4.2.1 Data 
Sri Lanka is a lower middle income country. Officially known as the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka, it is an island situated in the Indian Ocean just above the equator, 
bordering a major maritime route, the renowned ‘Silk Route’ connecting the western and 
eastern worlds. Sri Lanka is 65,610 km2 in extent with a population of around 21.2 
million. Sri Lanka is divided into 25 administrative districts within 9 provinces. As 
reported in the latest Annual Report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL, 2016), life 
expectancy of Sri Lankans is 75 years and they have a higher literacy rate of around 93%. 
Sri Lanka is ranked 73rd among 188 countries in the Human Development Index.  In 2016, 
Sri Lanka recorded a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$ 81.3 billion and per capita 
income of US$ 3,835 (at current market prices). In Sri Lanka both unemployment and 
real growth rates were 4.4%, in 2016. After ending a 30 year long war and terrorism in 
2009, the economy of Sri Lanka grew at an average rate of 6.4% during the next five 
years. Over the years Sri Lanka has developed to a service oriented economy from a 
traditional agricultural economy. In 2016, 62.5% of GDP was yielded from services 
sector, whilst manufacturing and agricultural sectors accounted for 29.6% and 7.9 of 
GDP, respectively.    
Natural disaster data are from the Disaster Management Centre of Sri Lanka, which 
maintains disaster related data in collaboration with ‘DesInventar’, the Disaster 
Information Management System of UNISDR, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction. Income data and other social and economic indicators are obtained from the 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) series conducted by the Department 
of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka from 1990 to 2013. There are six waves, i.e.  
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1990/91, 1995/96, 2002, 2006/07, 2009/10 and 2012/13 where the data are representative 
at district level. The only wave which covers the entire country is the latest 2012/13 
survey. Due to the ongoing civil war at that time, some districts of Northern and Eastern 
provinces were not covered in earlier waves. Mid-year district population data are taken 
from the Registrar General’s Department of Sri Lanka and the study uses the Consumer 
Price Index published by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
Extracting the data reported in the official website of Disaster Management Centre, we 
construct a district-wise annual disaster database for Sri Lanka from 1985 to 2013. It 
contains the number of people affected due to cyclones, droughts, epidemics, floods, 
gales, heavy rains, landslides, land subsidence, plagues, storms, strong winds, surges, 
tornados, and tsunami in each district, yearly. According to the database, around 27 
million people were affected from natural disasters in Sri Lanka during the period from 
1985 to 2013. Of them, 47% and 45% were affected by droughts and floods, respectively. 
Extreme wind events were responsible for 6% of the population affected whilst 2% were 
affected due to epidemics. Following Noy (2009), we normalise the number affected by 
disasters with lagged population. Thus, disasters are measured as the percentage of 
population affected due to all natural disasters in each district during a calendar year.  
To explore the impact of natural disasters on income inequality at district level in Sri 
Lanka, we compute the monthly income of each household in the survey year based on 
survey data of HIES series. In the calculations, we take into consideration all monetary 
and non-monetary income derived from all sources. Free State services, such as education 
and health, the value of which cannot be ascertained easily and exactly, were not included 
in the income. Accordingly, household income consists of the followings components 
(Department of Census and Statistics, 2015).  
83 
 
 
  
 
a) Employment income – wages-salaries, allowances (tips, commissions, 
overtime), bonus and arrears 
b) Seasonal agricultural income – paddy, chillies, onions, vegetables, cereals, 
yams, tobacco 
c) Other agricultural income – tea, rubber, coconut, coffee, pepper, betel, 
banana, fruits, meat, fish, egg, milk, other food, horticulture 
d) Non-agricultural income – mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
construction, trade, transport, guest house, restaurants, bars, hotels, etc. 
e) Cash receipts – such as pensions, disability / relief payments, dividends, rents, 
interest amounts received from various types of savings, educational grants 
and scholarships, school food program, current remittances and local and 
foreign transfers, other income 
f) Windfall income – income by chance or ad hoc gains such as compensations, 
lottery wins, loans, sale of assets such as land, house and jewellery, 
withdrawals from savings and bank deposits, gratuity, provident fund, income 
received from births, deaths and marriages, receipts from welfare society, 
seettu (an informal savings scheme among households), repayments of loans 
given, health and medical aid, insurance, foods and other commendations, 
disaster relief assistance, etc. 
g) Food in kind (mostly the estimated values of the household consumed items 
such as home grown fruits and vegetables) 
h) Non-food in kind (includes estimated rental values of owner occupied 
housing units) 
Household monthly income is calculated by aggregating monthly earnings received from 
all the components and then it is equivalised to take account of differences in household 
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size and composition so that it becomes a representative income. To adjust incomes on 
the basis of household size and composition, all incomes are expressed as the amount that 
an adult would require to enjoy the same standard of living. We employ the widely used 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) modified 
equivalence scale for this purpose. This scale, first proposed by Hagenaars, De Vos, and 
Asghar Zaidi (1994), assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to each additional 
adult member and of 0.3 to each child. A caveat is that OECD modified scale takes into 
account only the age and number of members in a household even though there may be 
other characteristics which may vary from household to household such as disability or 
health status of household members that affect the needs and capacities of such 
households. 
Adjusted household monthly income per adult equivalent after accounting for sample 
weights is used to calculate mean and median household incomes and inequality measures 
such as Theil index (Theil, 1967), Gini coefficient (Gini, 1936), inter quartile range and 
inter quintile range for average income for each district for each survey year. Income 
measures are converted to real terms using Colombo Consumers’ Price Index (annual 
average, base year 2006) for comparison across survey years.  
From the HIES 2006/07 onwards, 7 new sections have been introduced to the HIES series 
to collect almost all other household information that helps to understand the living 
standards of the households. These new areas are school education, health information, 
inventory of durable goods, access to infrastructure facilities, household debts and 
borrowings, information on housing, sanitary and disasters, and land and agriculture 
holdings (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015, p. 1). 
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Based on the above, we construct a panel dataset which contains data on household 
incomes and expenditures, income and expenditure inequalities, natural disasters, etc. for 
25 administrative districts in Sri Lanka for six survey time periods. This is an unbalanced 
panel as the number of districts covered varies between 17 and 25. The only wave which 
covers the entire country is the latest 2012/13 survey. Due to the ongoing civil war at that 
time some districts of Northern and Eastern provinces were not covered in other waves.   
Table 4.1:  Summary statistics 
      Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Theil 117 0.4396 0.3027 0.1675 2.4802 
Gini 117 0.4276 0.0614 0.2880 0.7168 
Inter Quartile Range (Rs.) 117           5,698            2,108          2,457          12,458  
Inter Quintile Range, Avg. Inc. (Rs.) 117         20,688          10,433          8,383          74,676  
Mean Household Income (Rs.)  117           8,891            3,388          4,404          20,580  
Median Household Income (Rs.) 117           6,228            1,926          3,302          13,409  
Q1 Average Income (Rs.) 117           2,075            1,463  - 9,823            5,627  
Q2 Average Income (Rs.) 117           4,490            1,386          2,223            9,809  
Q3 Average Income (Rs.) 117           6,264            1,945          3,326          13,534  
Q4 Average Income (Rs.) 117           8,941            2,951          4,552          19,437  
Q5 Average Income (Rs.) 117         22,763          10,929        10,109          77,315  
HCI (Head Count Index) 117 19.00 11.56 1.40 56.20 
% of Poor Households 100 15.48 11.05 1.10 42.20 
Household Size 117 4.23 0.38 3.68 5.13 
% of HH without Electrical Items 66 38.17 15.37 4.70 90.60 
% of HH without Vehicles 66 38.07 22.20 10.50 90.80 
% of HH with No Rooms 65 2.20 1.87 0 9.00 
% of HH with No Safe Drinking Water 66 13.17 10.93 0.50 48.60 
% of HH with No Toilet  62 4.31 5.02 0.10 24.40 
Disaster (% of Pop. Affected) 150 4.7368 13.4126 0 117.6589 
Disaster_lag1  150 8.5613 22.1317 0 174.3878 
Disaster_lag2  150 11.7633 23.4198 0 128.5260 
Disaster_lag3  150 4.0579 8.0361 0 56.1630 
Disaster_lag4  149 4.8619 10.9804 0 62.4662 
Disaster_lag5  149 10.7272 24.9794 0 174.3878 
Biological (% of Pop. Affected) 150 0.1079 0.2629 0 3.1072 
Climatic (% of Pop. Affected) 150 2.2285 11.4782 0 117.5446 
Geophysical (% of Pop. Affected)) 150 0.0137 0.1240 0 1.4415 
Hydrological (% of Pop. Affected) 150 2.1009 6.5334 0 52.6214 
Meteorological (% of Pop. Affected) 150 0.2859 2.9010 0 35.5536 
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Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 4.1. On 
average, disasters affect 5% of the population in a district per annum in Sri Lanka and the 
maximum percentage of population affected by natural disasters in a district can be as 
high as 118% (due to multiple disasters in a year). Figure 4.1 demonstrates the variation 
of mean percentage of population affected due to natural disasters across districts in Sri 
Lanka7.  
District-wise income inequality measured by Theil index is around 0.44 whilst Gini co-
efficient is around 0.43. Per adult equivalent real mean household income is Rs. 8,891 (in 
constant 2006/07 rupees). It is also observed that the income of the richest quintile is more 
than 10 folds larger compared to the poorest quintile. Average household size is around 
4 and about 15% of the households are poor. Around 2% of housing units are basic with 
no rooms. Around 38% of households do not possess vehicles or electric equipment. 
Meanwhile, around 13% of households do not have access to safe drinking water and 
around 4% of households do not have an exclusive toilet.  
 
 
  
                                                          
7 We used the Stata command spmap by Maurizio Pisati. See https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456812.html 
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Figure 4.1:  Variation of mean % of population affected due to natural disasters 
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Table 4.2 shows how inequality measures differ by districts. We observe a substantial 
variation of inequality among districts in Sri Lanka. Kurunegala District records the 
highest inequality whilst Mannar District records lowest inequality as measured by both 
Theil index and Gini coefficient.  Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 demonstrate the variation of 
mean inequality measured by Theil index across districts in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
Table 4.2:  Mean inequality measures by districts 
     District Theil Gini IQ4R 
(Constant 2006 Rs.) 
IQ5R, Avg. Income 
(Constant 2006 Rs.) 
     
Ampara 0.3788 0.4262 5,669 18,419 
Anuradhapura 0.3801 0.4003 5,440 18,231 
Badulla 0.3807 0.4284 4,898 17,422 
Batticaloa 0.3212 0.4077 5,461 16,488 
Colombo 0.4891 0.4654 9,719 36,015 
Galle 0.4403 0.4243 5,386 19,851 
Gampaha 0.4414 0.4248 7,443 26,731 
Hambantota 0.3373 0.4087 5,628 18,087 
Jaffna 0.3672 0.4168 4,756 16,921 
Kalutara 0.3356 0.4095 6,389 20,305 
Kandy 0.4732 0.4527 5,656 20,643 
Kegalle 0.3080 0.3921 4,765 15,021 
Kilinochchi 0.4853 0.4716 5,932 21,660 
Kurunegala 0.8070 0.4873 5,609 28,601 
Mannar 0.1784 0.3206 4,889 11,974 
Matale 0.3462 0.4215 5,242 17,141 
Matara 0.3195 0.4060 5,583 17,229 
Monaragala 0.4657 0.4456 4,757 19,152 
Mullaitivu 0.3091 0.4145 4,824 13,861 
Nuwara Eliya 0.6049 0.4153 3,911 18,537 
Polonnaruwa 0.5477 0.4245 5,719 22,674 
Puttalam 0.4577 0.4320 5,385 20,411 
Ratnapura 0.5605 0.4614 4,784 21,264 
Trincomalee 0.3660 0.4079 5,786 18,175 
Vavuniya 0.3629 0.4365 9,350 27,098 
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Figure 4.2:  Variation of mean inequality measured by Theil index across districts 
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Figure 4.3:  Variation of mean inequality measured by Theil index across districts, 
graphical representation 
 
 
Figure 4.4 presents within district variation of inequality as measured by Theil index over 
time. No such variation is presented for Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Mannar Districts as these 
districts were covered only in the last survey wave, i.e., 2012/13. We can observe a 
considerable variation of inequality over time for almost all the districts and this is the 
variation we exploit in this paper. 
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Figure 4.4:  Variation of inequality measured by Theil index by districts over time 
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Figure 4.5 depicts the relationship between current natural disaster affected population 
(%) and income inequality measured by Theil index after controlling for disaster lags, 
time invariant district fixed effects and time fixed effects. There appears to be a significant 
negative correlation between disasters and income inequality suggesting a possible 
reduction of income inequality by natural disasters. 
 
Figure 4.5:  Association between Theil index and natural disasters 
 
Notes: Above graphical representation is obtained using avplot command in Stata/IC 14.1 after controlling for 
disaster lags, district and time fixed effects. 
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4.2.2 Empirical Model 
We employ a panel regression estimator with district and time fixed effects as the main 
estimation strategy in our analysis. Fixed effects estimator is chosen since district and 
time fixed effects control for time-invariant spatial heterogeneity among districts and 
time-variant shocks that simultaneously affect all the districts, respectively. As such, this 
approach reduces any potential endogeneity issue.  
The panel regression equation of the baseline model is as follows; 
𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛤𝛤𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                (4.1) 
 
where income inequality as measured by Theil index in district i in Sri Lanka for survey 
time t, is the dependent variable. Dis is our variable of interest, disaster impact measured 
as the percentage of population affected due to all natural disasters occurred during the 
survey year in each district. We also include lagged disasters in the regression. Given the 
data availability, for each survey time five disaster lags are included in the regression in 
addition to the current disaster variable.  Terms 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are the district and time fixed 
effects included in the model, respectively. The final term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in the equation is the error 
term. Errors are clustered at district level.  
We check against omitted variable bias by adding more control variables, such as median 
household income, headcount index, % of poor households and other indicators which 
reflect social and economic status of households. In addition to the Theil index, we 
employ other alternative inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient, inter quartile 
range and inter quintile range of average income as the dependent variable. We rerun 
regressions excluding the extreme survey waves, i.e., 2006/07 which was after 2004 
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tsunami and 2009/10 survey which was after the ending of war/terrorism, to ensure that 
results are not driven by these extreme waves. 
Apart from the panel fixed effect estimator we use alternative estimators such as ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and System GMM to support our findings; see Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), (Roodman, 2009a) and 
(Roodman, 2009b). Once we are convinced that natural disasters affect income inequality, 
we explore how natural disasters affect level of income itself, particularly in different 
quintiles. As it is evident that income of all quintiles is reduced in the presence of 
disasters, we decompose inequality measured by Theil index into income components. 
We compare results with the differences in income composition of poor and rich quintiles 
as this exercise explains findings.  
As we are using the household income and expenditure survey data, we investigate 
whether there is any relationship between household expenditure inequality and natural 
disasters. We expand our analysis to disaster subgroups and repeat our analyses excluding 
biological disasters as the mechanisms are so different. Finally, we repeat our analysis 
without meteorological disasters since they appear to increase income inequality as the 
relative loss due to such disasters decreases with income. 
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 Results 
4.3.1 Base Model 
Table 4.3:  Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters: Base model 
 Dependent variable: Income inequality (Theil) 
Fixed Effects 
  
Disaster (% Population Affected) -0.00620** 
 (0.00252) 
Disaster_lag1  0.000640 
 (0.00106) 
Disaster_lag2 -0.00338* 
 (0.00166) 
Disaster_lag3 -0.00414* 
 (0.00208) 
Disaster_lag4 0.00473** 
 (0.00225) 
Disaster_lag5 0.000189 
 (0.00144) 
  
Observations 117 
Number of Districts 25 
R-squared 0.186 
  
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous and 
lagged disaster data. Model includes a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district 
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Results of the baseline model are given in Table 4.3. We find statistically significant 
negative impact of natural disasters that occurred in the same year, two years and three 
years prior to the survey on income inequality measured by Theil index. However, there 
appear to be a significant positive impact of natural disasters that took place 4 years before 
the survey on income inequality. Accordingly, an increase of current disaster affected 
population by one percentage point would reduce income inequality measured by Theil 
index by 0.0062 points, ceteris paribus.  
As this interpretation may suffer from lack of immediate apprehension, we provide here 
a hypothetical illustration for clarity. Using the latest 2012/13 Survey data, national 
inequality measured by Theil index is 0.46008. If we deduct the income of each household 
in the 5th quintile by 0.483% and redistribute the proceeds equally among all households 
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in the poorest quintile, the resultant Theil is 0.45388 (i.e. 0.46008 - 0.0062). Thus, an 
increase in disasters to affect one extra percentage point of people is equivalent to a half 
percent income tax on the richest fifth for redistribution to the poorest fifth.   
In our regressions we cluster errors at district level. Since administrative policy 
implementation is mostly carried out at provincial level, we alternatively clustered at 
provincial level also considering the potential spatial correlation of natural disasters and 
found similar results. 
   
4.3.2 Disaster Impact on Inequality of Components of Income 
To disentangle the ways by which income inequality is decreased due to natural disasters, 
we decompose income into its components, and compute the Theil index for each 
component.  
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 reveal that the negative impact of natural disasters on income 
inequality is not driven by receipts (which include any disaster relief payments) or by any 
foreign or domestic remittances households receive after disasters. Natural disasters and 
their immediate lags significantly decrease non-agricultural income inequality and non-
seasonal agricultural income inequality, but increase seasonal agricultural income 
inequality.  Given the strict labour laws which ensure the rights of employees in formal 
employment, Sri Lanka does not see any effect of natural disasters on employment 
income inequality. 
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show the composition of household income varies across 
quintiles. Rich quintiles receive a higher share of their income from non-agricultural 
sources such as business activities and non-seasonal agricultural activities compared to 
the poor whilst the share of income the poor receive from these sources is much lower. 
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Further, poorest households earn a higher share of income from seasonal agriculture most 
probably weather dependent, compared to the richest quintile. 
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Table 4.4:  Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters, by income component 
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous and lagged disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed 
effects. Errors clustered at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 
 Dependent variable: Inequality – Component of income (Theil) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Total  Employ Agri Agri_Other Non_Agri Kind  Receipts Remittances 
         
Disaster -0.00620** 0.000707 0.00200* -0.00961** -0.0112** -0.00272 9.03e-05 0.00313 
 (0.00252) (0.000639) (0.00117) (0.00396) (0.00525) (0.00160) (0.00155) (0.00212) 
Dis_lag1 0.000640 0.000133 -0.00100 0.00326 -0.000655 -0.000824 0.000355 0.000733 
 (0.00106) (0.000256) (0.000695) (0.00249) (0.00146) (0.000648) (0.000630) (0.000832) 
Dis_lag2 -0.00338* -0.000314 0.00209** -0.00181 -0.00592** 0.000620 -0.00134 0.00183* 
 (0.00166) (0.000495) (0.000884) (0.00238) (0.00248) (0.000758) (0.000907) (0.000997) 
Dis_lag3 -0.00414* -0.000763 -0.00260 -0.0127*** -0.00525 -6.12e-05 0.000392 -0.000528 
 (0.00208) (0.000636) (0.00287) (0.00431) (0.00569) (0.00190) (0.00150) (0.00230) 
Dis_lag4 0.00473** -0.000156 0.00221 0.00513 0.0128** -0.000331 0.00398** -0.00101 
 (0.00225) (0.000623) (0.00156) (0.00515) (0.00530) (0.00148) (0.00147) (0.00164) 
Dis_lag5 0.000189 0.000207 -0.000370 0.00153 0.000430 -0.00102 0.000755* 0.000590 
 (0.00144) (0.000244) (0.000491) (0.00200) (0.00352) (0.000682) (0.000419) (0.000611) 
         
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
R-squared 0.186 0.114 0.244 0.251 0.112 0.510 0.515 0.156 
Districts 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
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Table 4.5:  Summary: How do disasters affect inequality of components of income? 
 Dependent variable: Inequality – Component of income (Theil) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Total Income Employ Agri Agri_Other Non_Agri Kind Receipts 
        
Disasters ↓  ↑ ↓ ↓   
Dis_lag1        
Dis_lag2 ↓  ↑  ↓   
Dis_lag3 ↓   ↓    
Dis_lag4 ↑    ↑  ↑ 
Dis_lag5       ↑ 
        
 
 
Table 4.6:  Average share of income by components (%) 
 Employ Agri Agri_other Non_agri Kind Receipts 
       
Q1 44.22 7.01 4.98 1.43 22.63 19.80 
Q2 47.18 5.40 6.69 9.72 15.86 15.07 
Q3 48.06 5.13 7.36 9.58 14.60 15.27 
Q4 44.21 4.82 7.69 12.73 14.10 16.44 
Q5 31.29 3.32 11.83 24.48 11.53 17.43 
Disaster Impact  ↑ ↓ ↓   
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Table 4.7:  Share of income by component (%) 
 
 Employ Agri Agri_other Non_agri Kind Receipts Total 
19
90
/9
1 
Q1 43.28 7.94 6.34 6.55 15.76 20.21  
Q2 48.58 6.49 7.99 9.08 12.30 15.47  
Q3 50.26 6.44 8.79 8.07 11.74 14.70  
Q4 46.39 6.34 9.09 12.56 12.00 13.56  
Q5 34.74 4.67 10.21 25.36 11.98 12.86  
         
19
95
/9
6 
Q1 46.38 7.42 5.97 1.12 20.78 18.39  
Q2 49.59 6.08 7.63 9.21 15.24 12.37  
Q3 51.42 4.70 7.46 9.93 14.40 12.01  
Q4 48.77 3.90 7.11 12.14 14.76 12.99  
Q5 41.95 2.18 7.95 21.51 14.32 12.29  
         
20
02
 
Q1 71.20 8.71 6.37 -45.57 38.31 21.00  
Q2 52.61 4.19 6.21 9.81 17.35 9.76  
Q3 50.84 3.68 6.66 10.87 16.72 11.30  
Q4 47.58 2.98 6.24 12.84 16.77 13.46  
Q5 35.23 1.82 8.34 22.20 14.13 18.17  
         
20
06
/0
7 
Q1 45.49 4.59 3.78 -3.32 32.75 16.76  
Q2 45.55 3.03 4.43 10.42 22.88 13.62  
Q3 43.78 2.59 5.17 12.41 19.79 16.19  
Q4 40.23 1.95 6.17 13.99 17.90 19.75  
Q5 28.39 1.36 13.08 20.11 10.40 26.45  
         
20
09
/1
0 
Q1 46.15 6.13 1.99 -10.47 36.81 19.37  
Q2 43.21 4.26 4.17 10.74 22.64 14.88  
Q3 42.50 3.77 5.06 12.31 20.00 16.48  
Q4 39.75 3.09 5.36 12.53 17.91 21.52  
Q5 22.45 1.75 16.47 28.69 10.08 20.58  
         
20
12
/1
3 
Q1 42.37 4.10 0.89 -4.84 37.95 19.58  
Q2 43.96 3.12 4.40 11.23 21.70 15.57  
Q3 44.56 2.47 4.54 11.97 19.12 17.35  
Q4 39.90 2.09 5.12 12.97 16.89 23.06  
Q5 26.62 1.26 13.88 20.34 11.03 26.81  
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Dis  ↑ ↓ ↓   ↓ 
Dis_lag1        
Dis_lag2  ↑  ↓   ↓ 
Dis_lag3   ↓    ↓ 
Dis_lag4    ↑  ↑ ↑ 
Dis_lag5      ↑  
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 Robustness Checks  
4.4.1 Balanced Panel 
The number of districts covered in the survey changes over time as some districts of 
Northern and Eastern provinces were not covered in earlier waves due to the ongoing 
civil war at that time.  To ensure that results are not driven by the newly added districts, 
we rerun our baseline regression with a balanced panel of 17 districts for the six waves. 
Results as presented in Table 4.8 support our original findings although the significance 
level of coefficients on the variables of interest is lower compared to the base model. 
Table 4.8:  Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters: Base model 
with a balanced panel of 17 districts 
 Dependent variable: Income inequality (Theil) 
Fixed Effects 
  
Disaster (% Population Affected) -0.00651* 
 (0.00345) 
Disaster_lag1  0.000532 
 (0.000992) 
Disaster_lag2 -0.00218 
 (0.00177) 
Disaster_lag3 -0.00687* 
 (0.00348) 
Disaster_lag4 0.00122 
 (0.00306) 
Disaster_lag5 -0.000260 
 (0.00183) 
  
Observations 102 
Number of Districts 17 
R-squared 0.204 
  
Notes: Balanced panel of 17 districts with district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys, corresponding 
contemporaneous and lagged disaster data. Model includes a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors 
clustered at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.4.2  Additional Controls 
The above results hold in the presence of other control variables, namely, real median 
household income (in constant 2006 Rs.), poverty head count index (HCI) and the share 
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of poor households (Table 4.9). The HCI is the percentage of population below the official 
poverty line, which is based upon the real total expenditure per person per month; a 
household with members whose per capita expenditure is below the official poverty line 
is considered as a poor household (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015).  
Table 4.9:  Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters: Controls 
 
Dependent variable: Income inequality (Theil) 
(1) (2) 
   
Disaster (% Population Affected) -0.00805*** -0.00947*** 
 (0.00224) (0.00300) 
Disaster_lag1 -0.000313 -0.000435 
 (0.00134) (0.00165) 
Disaster_lag2 -0.00308** -0.00404 
 (0.00134) (0.00249) 
Disaster_lag3 -0.00585** -0.00831* 
 (0.00268) (0.00450) 
Disaster_lag4 0.00650** 0.00504 
 (0.00260) (0.00311) 
Disaster_lag5 0.000152 9.85e-06 
 (0.00132) (0.00113) 
Real Median Household Income (logged) 0.0986 -0.0799 
 (0.237) (0.281) 
HCI 0.0190*  
 (0.00950)  
% of Poor Households  0.0174 
  (0.0113) 
   
Observations 117 100 
R-squared 0.245 0.203 
Number of Districts 25 25 
   
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous and 
lagged disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district 
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.4.3 Alternative Inequality Metrics 
We check whether our results hold for different inequality measures such as Gini 
coefficient, inter quintile range for average income and inter quartile range. As shown in 
Table 4.10, disasters and their immediate lags reduce income inequality not only 
measured by the Theil index but also by the Gini coefficient and the inter quintile range 
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of average income. Further, disasters occurred in the previous year seem to significantly 
reduce inter quartile range of income. 
Table 4.10:  Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters: Alternative 
inequality metrics, Gini coefficient, inter quintile range (IQ5R), and inter 
quartile range (IQ4R) 
 
Dependent variable: Income inequality 
(1) (2) (3) 
Gini  IQ5R (ln) IQ4R (ln) 
    
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) -0.00139*** -0.00453*** 0.000759 
 (0.000396) (0.00126) (0.000718) 
Disaster_lag1 -3.73e-05 -0.000605 -0.000764** 
 (0.000242) (0.000991) (0.000279) 
Disaster_lag2 -0.000596** -0.00235** -0.000268 
 (0.000227) (0.000948) (0.000593) 
Disaster_lag3 -0.00128** -0.00557** -0.000123 
 (0.000531) (0.00210) (0.000646) 
Disaster_lag4 0.00156** 0.00627** 0.000621 
 (0.000646) (0.00275) (0.00184) 
Disaster_lag5 2.73e-05 -0.000245 4.59e-05 
 (0.000214) (0.000830) (0.000378) 
Real Median Household Income (logged) -0.0584 0.570* 0.629** 
 (0.0490) (0.285) (0.230) 
HCI 0.00252 0.00512 -0.00391 
 (0.00152) (0.00850) (0.00312) 
    
Observations 117 117 117 
R-squared 0.411 0.808 0.945 
Number of Districts 25 25 25 
    
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous and 
lagged disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district 
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When we run the regression for alternative inequality measures with current disasters and 
additional relevant controls on access to safe drinking water and hygienic facilities, 
structure of the house and possession of movable properties which reflect socio-economic 
status of households, we observe that current disasters significantly decrease income 
inequality measured by alternative inequality metrics (Table 4.11). 
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Table 4.11:  Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters: Current 
disasters with additional controls 
 Dependent variable: Income inequality 
(1) (2) (3) 
Theil Gini IQ5R (ln) 
    
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) -0.0151*** -0.00209*** -0.00912*** 
 (0.00492) (0.000736) (0.00243) 
% of HH without safe drinking water 0.0140* 0.00219* 0.00483 
 (0.00757) (0.00122) (0.00502) 
% of HH without a toilet  -0.0161 -0.00364 -0.0207 
 (0.0310) (0.00529) (0.0199) 
% of HH with no rooms -0.0532 -0.00588 0.0117 
 (0.0513) (0.00909) (0.0345) 
% of HH without electric equipment 0.0210 0.00124 -0.000979 
 (0.0128) (0.00203) (0.00825) 
% of HH without vehicles -0.00183 0.00136 -0.00370 
 (0.0120) (0.00198) (0.00772) 
    
Observations 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.232 0.202 0.177 
Number of Districts 25 25 25 
    
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous 
disaster data. IQ5R is the inter quintile range for average income. Models include a constant term, district and time 
fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
 
4.4.4 Outliers 
We exclude the survey wave 2006/07 which was after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 
December 2004 and the survey wave 2009/10 which was after the ending of 30 years long 
terrorist war alternatively and simultaneously, results still remain significant (Table 4.12). 
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Table 4.12: Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters: Excluding 
possible outlier waves  
 
Dependent variable: Income inequality (Theil) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Without wave just 
after Tsunami 
Without wave after 
ending of war 
Without both the 
waves 
    
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) -0.00541** -0.00399* -0.00116* 
 (0.00260) (0.00230) (0.000617) 
Disaster_lag1 0.000326 0.00104 0.000493 
 (0.00105) (0.00115) (0.000786) 
Disaster_lag2 -0.00174* -0.00260 0.000246 
 (0.000921) (0.00174) (0.00144) 
Disaster_lag3 -0.00229 -0.00416** -0.00750** 
 (0.00350) (0.00169) (0.00298) 
Disaster_lag4 0.00504** 0.00298 -2.12e-05 
 (0.00200) (0.00184) (0.00325) 
Disaster_lag5 0.00226 -0.000598 -0.000578 
 (0.00406) (0.00107) (0.00116) 
    
Observations 98 95 76 
R-squared 0.228 0.212 0.367 
Number of Districts 25 25 25 
    
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for five waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous and 
lagged disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district 
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.4.5 Alternative Estimators 
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate the model using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and, difference and system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators. 
As apparent from Table 4.13, alternative estimators, OLS and system GMM yield 
consistent results. Difference GMM also yields consistent results at least with respect to 
the sign on the coefficient. In this exercise, we restrict our explanatory variables to current 
disasters and HCI. The GMM uses lagged values of independent variables which are not 
strictly exogenous as internal instruments. Therefore, the inclusion of additional disaster 
lags in the model may complicate the process. 
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Table 4.13: Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters: Alternative 
estimators 
 
Dependent variable: Income inequality (Theil) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FE OLS Diff. GMM Sys. GMM 
     
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) -0.00621** -0.00362** -0.00509 -0.00821** 
 (0.00275) (0.00152) (0.00363) (0.00363) 
HCI 0.0147 0.00284 0.0166 0.0182 
 (0.00910) (0.00361) (0.0128) (0.0146) 
     
Observations 117 117 92 117 
R-squared 0.198 0.115   
Number of Districts 25  22 25 
     
Number of Instruments   10 11 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(1)   0.067 0.088 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(2)   0.714 0.652 
Hansen Test    0.234 0.213 
     
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous 
disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Lags used to instrument the endogenous 
variables in Difference GMM and system GMM regressions limited to 10. 
 
4.4.6 Disaster Impact on Income 
As shown in Table 4.14, current natural disasters negatively affect mean household 
income whilst the disasters occurred in the previous year negatively affect median 
household income. Income of the poorest quintile is reduced by current disasters and 
disasters occurred three years before. Income of the middle quintiles is reduced by the 
disasters occurred in the previous year. Richest quintile’s income is decreased by current 
disasters and disasters occurred two and three years before. So, we find clear evidence 
that income of all the quintiles is affected by natural disasters.
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Table 4.14: Results for regressing income on natural disasters  
 Dependent variable: Household income (logged)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mean  Median  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
        
Disasters -0.00507** -0.00180 -0.0109*** -0.00212 -0.00172 -0.00152 -0.00613*** 
 (0.00185) (0.00154) (0.00387) (0.00159) (0.00163) (0.00166) (0.00186) 
Dis_lag1 -0.000724 -0.00101*** 0.00151 -0.00102*** -0.00108*** -0.00127*** -0.000596 
 (0.000537) (0.000299) (0.00205) (0.000331) (0.000292) (0.000301) (0.000832) 
Dis_lag2 -0.00104 0.000328 0.00104 0.000502 0.000298 0.000107 -0.00209** 
 (0.000691) (0.000561) (0.00127) (0.000763) (0.000567) (0.000475) (0.000945) 
Dis_lag3 -0.00358* -0.00124 -0.00598* -0.00111 -0.000954 -0.000852 -0.00546** 
 (0.00192) (0.00141) (0.00304) (0.00174) (0.00142) (0.00134) (0.00239) 
Dis_lag4 0.00209 0.000165 0.00269 -5.09e-05 0.000146 0.000795 0.00485* 
 (0.00157) (0.00117) (0.00263) (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00133) (0.00235) 
Dis_lag5 0.000563 0.000395 0.00180 0.000293 0.000355 0.000348 0.000333 
 (0.000797) (0.000424) (0.00114) (0.000473) (0.000437) (0.000508) (0.000967) 
        
Observations 117 117 113 117 117 117 117 
R-squared 0.852 0.905 0.414 0.882 0.907 0.922 0.799 
Districts 25 25 24 25 25 25 25 
        
Notes: Panel of district level measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous and lagged disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. 
Errors clustered at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.4.7 Disasters and Household Expenditure Inequality 
We repeat our analysis for household expenditure inequality. As in the previous analysis, 
we calculate per adult equivalent household expenditure and then calculate district wise 
inequality measures for each survey wave. When we estimate our baseline specification 
using panel fixed effects estimator, we do not find any impact of natural disasters on 
expenditure inequality measured either by Theil index or Gini coefficient (Table 4.15).  
There may be two plausible explanations for this. One is that households suffer income 
losses due to natural disasters disproportionately across quintiles, however, they act as if 
they have a permanent income when it comes to expenditure and therefore do not change 
their spending behaviour. The other is that all the households reduce their expenditure 
proportionately across quintiles in the presence of natural disasters. Both scenarios would 
lead to no change in expenditure inequality among households due to natural disasters. 
 
Table 4.15: Results for regressing expenditure inequality on natural disasters  
 Dependent variable: Expenditure inequality  
(1) (2) 
Theil Gini 
   
Disaster (% Population Affected) 0.00116 0.000239 
 (0.00145) (0.000318) 
Disaster_lag1 0.000136 4.41e-05 
 (0.000130) (8.06e-05) 
Disaster_lag2 0.000427 0.000205 
 (0.000321) (0.000146) 
Disaster_lag3 -5.63e-05 -5.06e-05 
 (0.000434) (0.000255) 
Disaster_lag4 -0.00124 -0.000379 
 (0.00131) (0.000578) 
Disaster_lag5 6.81e-05 6.54e-05 
 (0.000172) (6.67e-05) 
   
Observations 117 117 
R-squared 0.321 0.514 
Number of Districts 25 25 
   
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous and 
lagged disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district 
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.4.8 Disaster Subgroups and Income Inequality 
Accepting the fact that natural disasters differ in nature, intensity, duration and impact, 
we repeat our analysis by disaster subgroups. Table 4.16 shows a significant negative 
impact of geophysical, hydrological and meteorological disasters on different income 
inequality measures.  
Table 4.16: Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters by disaster type  
 Dependent variable: Income inequality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Theil Gini IQ4R (ln) IQ5R (ln) 
     
Biological 0.0645 0.00520 0.0447* 0.0157 
 (0.146) (0.0198) (0.0238) (0.0782) 
Climatic -0.00411 -0.000545 0.000362 -0.00149 
 (0.00328) (0.000485) (0.00144) (0.00128) 
Geophysical -0.181* -0.0587*** -0.0250 -0.185*** 
 (0.0879) (0.0144) (0.0201) (0.0558) 
Hydrological -0.00729 -0.00123 -0.00261 -0.00875** 
 (0.00574) (0.00135) (0.00246) (0.00398) 
Meteorological -0.00102 -5.91e-05 -0.00760*** -0.0115*** 
 (0.00443) (0.00100) (0.00153) (0.00227) 
     
Observations 117 117 117 117 
R-squared 0.164 0.333 0.902 0.786 
No. of Districts 25 25 25 25 
     
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous 
disaster data. IQ4R is the inter quartile range. IQ5R is the inter quintile range for average income. Models include a 
constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Some argue that biological disasters are very different from other natural disasters. We 
therefore replicate the analysis excluding biological disasters from total disasters. This 
exercise derives similar results as for the base model (see Table 4.17).  
As shown in Table 4.18, different natural disaster subgroups affect mean, median 
household incomes and income across quintiles differently. Meteorological disasters may 
appear to increase income inequality on the face of results, as the relative loss due to such 
disasters decreases with income. Nevertheless, we do not find evidence to that effect; see 
Table 4.16. As a further step, we rerun our regression excluding meteorological disasters 
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from total disasters to ensure that it is not linked with the metrics being used (Table 4.19).  
Results are very similar to the base model’s results. 
 
Table 4.17: Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters excluding 
biological disasters  
 Dependent variable: Income inequality (Theil) 
Fixed Effects 
  
Disaster (% Population Affected) -0.00624** 
 (0.00256) 
Disaster_lag1 0.000627 
 (0.00106) 
Disaster_lag2 -0.00341* 
 (0.00167) 
Disaster_lag3 -0.00421* 
 (0.00209) 
Disaster_lag4 0.00465* 
 (0.00226) 
Disaster_lag5 0.000184 
 (0.00144) 
  
Observations 117 
Number of Districts 25 
R-squared 0.186 
  
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous 
disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
Table 4.18: Results for regressing income on different disaster subgroups  
 Dependent variable: Household Income (logged) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) (7) 
Mean Median  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
        
Biological 0.0443 0.0398*** -0.0268 0.0300*** 0.0360*** 0.0276* 0.0283 
 (0.0599) (0.0117) (0.0374) (0.00981) (0.0111) (0.0140) (0.0805) 
Climatic -0.00368* -0.00117 -0.0111** -0.00141 -0.00101 -0.000659 -0.00347 
 (0.00213) (0.00124) (0.00478) (0.00111) (0.00128) (0.00131) (0.00207) 
Geophysical -0.110*** 0.0361* -0.430*** 0.0227 0.0339* 0.0152 -0.202*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0188) (0.0601) (0.0182) (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0516) 
Hydrological -0.0059*** -0.00287 -0.00595 -0.00350 -0.00317 -0.00320 -0.00826** 
 (0.00184) (0.00232) (0.00424) (0.00236) (0.00240) (0.00234) (0.00371) 
Meteorological -0.0118*** -0.0096*** -0.0137*** -0.0118*** -0.0098*** -0.0095*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.00151) (0.00176) (0.00331) (0.00185) (0.00181) (0.00165) (0.00259) 
        
Observations 117 117 113 117 117 117 117 
R-squared 0.847 0.903 0.413 0.883 0.905 0.918 0.788 
Districts 25 25 24 25 25 25 25 
        
Notes: Panel of district level measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous disaster data. 
Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.19: Results for regressing income inequality on natural disasters excluding 
meteorological disasters 
 Dependent variable: Income inequality (Theil) 
Fixed Effects 
  
Disaster (% Population Affected) -0.00646** 
 (0.00248) 
Disaster_lag1 0.000460 
 (0.00101) 
Disaster_lag2 -0.00281* 
 (0.00156) 
Disaster_lag3 -0.00524** 
 (0.00219) 
Disaster_lag4 0.00463** 
 (0.00219) 
Disaster_lag5 9.24e-05 
 (0.00136) 
  
Observations 117 
Number of Districts 25 
R-squared 0.187 
  
Notes: Panel of district level inequality measures for six waves of surveys with corresponding contemporaneous 
disaster data. Models include a constant term, district and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the district level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Discussion and Conclusion 
We explore the impact of natural disasters on income inequality in Sri Lanka at district 
level, the first study of this nature for the country. We construct a unique panel dataset 
for the purpose that includes inter alia district wise inequality/income measures and 
percentages of population affected due to natural disasters in each district for the six 
survey periods of the HIES series between 1990 and 2013. Using panel fixed effects 
estimator as the main empirical strategy we find that contemporaneous natural disasters 
and their immediate lags decrease district level income inequality as measured by the 
Theil index, and substantially so. These results are robust across alternative inequality 
metrics, sub-samples and alternative estimators. However, we do not find any evidence 
to the effect that natural disasters affect household expenditure inequality. This is possible 
if households do not change their expenditure patterns despite their income being affected 
by disasters or if they might reduce their expenditure proportionately across income 
quintiles as a result of disaster consequences. 
Further analysis suggests that although natural disasters negatively affect household 
income across all the quintiles, rich quintiles disproportionately bear direct disaster 
damages at a higher cost. Even though the poor are more vulnerable to disasters, when 
the poor live a subsistence lifestyle and if they do not possess or own much material assets, 
their losses will be less compared to the rich. Rich may lose income deriving capital assets 
more due to destruction and through sale as a coping strategy. On the other hand, if the 
poor are mainly engaged in low-skilled or unskilled labour they can easily diversify their 
income sources in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Whilst the rich may suffer profit 
losses, disasters may open the poor a door for new opportunities. It is evident from our 
decomposition results that natural disasters decrease non-agricultural income inequality 
and non-seasonal agricultural income inequality. Household income composition shows 
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that the richest quintile receives a much higher share of their income from these very 
activities compared to the poor. When the rich suffer greater losses in profits and income 
due to disasters, it is inevitable that household income inequality would decrease, 
however, at the expense of the rich. Our findings warrant policies to safeguard the 
interests of middle and higher income groups in disaster consequences.  
To achieve effective poverty reduction and inclusive growth, the desired is a lower 
inequality in general. McKay and Pal (2004) present strong evidence that lower initial 
inequality has a favourable influence on subsequent consumption across many Indian 
states. Although, lower income inequality is desirable for poverty reduction and to 
achieve inclusive growth, as a low income inequality derived through higher damages 
caused to middle and richer quintiles does not reflect true distributive justice, change of 
inequality in the face of natural disasters should be read with caution. Further, policy 
makers should give sufficient consideration to natural disasters in designing and 
implementing policies to promote poverty reduction and inclusive economic growth. 
Our study does not capture potential internal migration as a result of natural disasters 
which would otherwise have explained the decrease in income inequality. This would be 
a limitation to our analysis. Future research can address this issue although this study is 
constrained with data availability. Further, Sri Lanka is just one country out of many that 
face various natural disaster consequences and issues relating to distributive justice at the 
same time. Furthermore, as Sri Lanka is a lower middle income country with an economy 
oriented towards services and industry, it could not represent lower income countries 
which mainly depend on agriculture and are more vulnerable to disasters. Therefore, this 
analysis could be repeated for other countries with better data as an avenue for future 
research.  
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis examined the impact of natural disasters on three important economic aspects 
which contribute to the achievement of economic development and distributive justice. 
Although destructive natural catastrophes are considered as a hindrance for development, 
indirect effect of disasters on development through their impact on financial development 
and foreign aid diversification cannot be undermined. If the contraction of income 
inequality we sometimes observe in developing economies comes at the expense of 
middle and high income earners, it does not reflect true distributive justice and thus should 
be a grave concern for policy makers. In this concluding chapter, I summarise the 
findings, policy implications and limitations of my thesis and the potential future research 
avenues it opens up.  
The first empirical paper explored the impact of natural disasters on financial 
development proxied by private credit. It found that companies and households get deeper 
into debt after a natural disaster in the short run. It presented evidence for credit deepening 
in the long run, too. These findings invite relevant policy makers in disaster vulnerable 
countries to take well informed and well thought decisions with respect to financial 
inclusion, domestic bank lending and directed credit. Hallegatte et al. (2017, p. 2) identify 
opportunities for action and policy priorities at the country level, to make people more 
resilient to disasters. They highlight expanding financial inclusion as one of the policies 
to reduce well-being losses. As immediate and unconstrained credit is essential for a 
speedy recovery in poorer countries, policies should be implemented to enhance credit 
availability, especially to reach individuals with lower credit worthiness due to non-
availability of acceptable securities. Specifically, policies are warranted to enhance 
financial literacy of rural people so that they would be in a position to accumulate their 
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wealth in the forms (e.g. financial assets such as deposits and financial instruments) which 
are not subject to easy destruction in the face of natural disasters. Furthered financial 
literacy helps people to be part of the formal financial system which in turn increases their 
access to credit when need arises. Also, financial sector regulators (Central Bank or the 
Monetary Authority, as the case may be) in disaster prone developing countries can 
impose directed credit directives to their lending institutions which make it obligatory for 
such institutions to dedicate a certain share of their lending portfolio towards specific 
sectors.     
On the limitation side of my study, I use private credit to proxy financial development. It 
is to be noted that private credit represents only one aspect, i.e., depth of financial 
development which is multi-faceted. This poses the question whether the mere deepening 
in credit could be interpreted as financial development. Further, financial markets are less 
well developed in poorer countries which are more vulnerable to disasters and the role 
played by formal credit therein in disaster consequences might be small. Therefore, my 
study may not be capturing the true image of the least developed world.  Thus, further 
research can be done with much appropriate proxies for financial development as and 
when data become available in the future. 
This paper used EM-DAT data to construct the disaster measure used in the analysis. 
Even though I consider EM-DAT database as the best available disaster data set and most 
of the disaster literature is based on this data, it should be noted that some scholars 
question the validity of these data. One reason for this is the arbitrary thresholds (i.e. 
reported death toll of 10 or more; 100 people reported affected; a call for international 
assistance; or the declaration of the state of emergency) they use for a disaster to be 
entered into their database (Miao & Popp, 2014). Their sources of data maybe lacking the 
necessary expertise to estimate economic losses and their data maybe suffering from 
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measurement error. In some instances, even a severe disaster may not kill as per the 
database (Cavallo & Noy, 2011; Gassebner et al., 2010; Klomp, 2014). I also noticed with 
surprise instances where there are deaths but none has been affected, which is highly 
unlikely. Indeed, I repeat my analysis with alternative disaster data, i.e., the ifo GAME 
data, which are purely based on disaster intensities and yield consistent results supporting 
my findings. However, then the question arises whether we can consider natural 
catastrophes as natural disasters by definition, knowing nothing about how they affected 
man or his artifacts (Dacy & Kunreuther, 1969). I do not see any immediate remedy for 
this as we cannot have it both ways.    
In this paper I used nationally aggregate data. Changes at the aggregate level are open to 
misinterpretation and may obscure the actual mechanisms. Therefore, the analysis here 
should be repeated with micro data. I found that natural disasters affect financial 
development. Earlier papers found that financial development affects vulnerability to 
natural disasters. The analysis should therefore be repeated with a dynamic model of 
simultaneous equations. These issues are deferred to future research. 
The second empirical paper raised the question whether natural disasters affect foreign 
aid concentration in recipient countries. I found that natural disasters lead to a reduction 
in aid concentration.  Natural disasters appear to attract not only disaster related aid but 
also aid aimed at other development aspects. Therefore, relevant policy makers should 
make sure that these donations are invested effectively on the desired purposes. However, 
as per the existing literature it appears that aid concentration negatively affects the 
economic growth of recipient countries. As such, there should be policies to avoid 
fungibility or to ensure the elimination of potential crowding out of usual government 
spending on development tasks due to political moral hazard.  
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In this paper, to measure aid concentration I have employed the commonly used 
concentration measure, Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). However, one can argue that 
the right measure for the purpose would be Gini co-efficient or an entropy measure rather 
than HHI; see Davies (1979). These are typical inequality measures. “The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) is the most widely treated summary measure of concentration in 
the theoretical literature and often serves as a benchmark for the evaluation of other 
concentration indices” (Bikker & Haaf, 2002, p. 7). “Concentration and Inequality are 
related concepts which have been historically confused… The most common measure of 
concentration has historically been the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI)...” (Ávila, 
Flores, López-Gallo, & Márquez, 2013, p. 3) Nevertheless, I repeated my analysis for the 
base model alternatively using Gini coefficient and Theil index as the measure of aid 
concentration; unreported results were strongly consistent with the original results. 
There is only a limited number of different aid categories for which donors donate and a 
limited number of donors in the world with potential and willingness to donate. In 
addition, disasters are not evenly distributed across countries. As such, my study may not 
represent a universal picture. Further, it does not identify the exact mechanisms through 
which natural disasters influence aid concentration or aid concentration affects economic 
development. Future research can address these issues. As this paper too use nationally 
aggregate data, a possible improvement would be to repeat the analysis for case studies 
using microdata.  
In the third and final empirical paper, I investigated the relationship between natural 
disasters on regional income inequality in Sri Lanka, a lower middle income country. 
Using a purpose-built panel dataset based on disaster affected population and inequality 
measures derived from a household income and expenditure survey series, I found that 
natural disasters decrease income inequality among Sri Lankan households. However, 
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natural disasters do not affect household expenditure inequality. Further analysis showed 
that natural disasters decrease non-seasonal agricultural and non-agricultural income 
inequality but increase seasonal- agricultural income inequality. This was explained as 
the richer households mainly receive their income from non-agricultural and non-seasonal 
agricultural activities. In contrary, poorer households have a higher share of seasonal 
agricultural income compared to the rich. 
My findings warrant policies to safeguard the interests of middle and higher income 
groups in disaster consequences. Generally, the desirable is the lower income inequality 
(McKay & Pal, 2004). However, the reduction in income inequality achieved at the 
expense of middle and high income earners does not reflect a true distributive justice. As 
such, policy makers should give due considerations to natural disasters as an important 
dimension when designing and implementing poverty reduction and inclusive growth 
oriented policies. Further, any income inequality reduction policy makers observe in 
disaster vulnerable developing economies should be read with caution.  
Every effort has been exerted to include all monetary and non-monetary income derived 
from all sources, in calculations. However, free State services such as education and 
health the value of which cannot be imputed easily and exactly, are not included in the 
income. Further, the OECD modified equivalence scale which was used to arrive at per 
adult equivalent income/expenditure does not take into consideration some household 
characteristics, such as health status and disabilities of household members that affect 
specific household needs and capacities. These may pose biases in estimations, however, 
these are common issues to any household survey. 
My data do not capture possible internal migration due to natural disasters which would 
otherwise have explained the decrease in income inequality. This would be a limitation 
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of my analysis. Future research can address this issue although this study is constrained 
with data availability.  
Further, recent research (Patankar, 2017) suggests that frequent urban and flash floods 
severely affect very poor individuals, especially, people who live in temporary huts, 
slums, shanties and single-storied buildings, repeatedly. It is believed that these events do 
not enter formal databases in the normal course, but their impact on poor people could be 
large, especially through health effects. Also, such disasters could negatively impact the 
income of the poor through missed days of work. This would cause biases in the 
estimations. Therefore, this analysis could be repeated with carefully collected broadened 
primary data.  
Furthermore, Sri Lanka is just one country out of many which face various natural disaster 
consequences and issues relating to distributive justice at the same time. Therefore, to 
repeat this analysis for other countries would be another potential avenue for future 
research, for clarity.    
My thesis showed that destructive natural disasters sometimes lead to unexpected 
outcomes. If we are prudent enough to recognise the true nature of unavoidable and 
destructive disaster consequences, it is possible to transform the threats of natural 
disasters into development efforts in order to enhance the development outlook of our 
economies.   
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A Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
Figure A.1: Percentage effect of natural disasters on per capita credit (using 2011 
values)  
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Figure A.2: Effect of natural disasters on per capita credit (%, using 2011 values) 
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Table A.1:  Average impact of natural disasters on credit in selected countries 
Country Avg. GDP pc ($) $ Effect SD Avg. Credit pc ($) %Effect SD 
       
Equatorial Guinea 4,279 -3.69 2.40 230 -1.61 1.04 
El Salvador 2,310 -0.81 2.09 123 -0.66 1.70 
Dominican Republic 2,953 -1.96 2.15 674 -0.29 0.32 
Brazil 4,398 -3.82 2.42 1,427 -0.27 0.17 
Ecuador 2,788 -1.69 2.12 635 -0.27 0.33 
Namibia 3,261 -2.42 2.20 1,757 -0.14 0.12 
Maldives 3,920 -3.28 2.32 3,005 -0.11 0.08 
United States 35,998 -13.63 5.44 19,042 -0.07 0.03 
Australia 27,780 -12.42 5.01 20,377 -0.06 0.02 
Ireland 31,106 -12.95 5.20 34,841 -0.04 0.01 
Sri Lanka 940 3.39 2.60 219 1.55 1.19 
India 538 5.99 3.31 168 3.57 1.97 
Pakistan 571 5.72 3.22 133 4.30 2.42 
Yemen, Rep. 767 4.34 2.84 45 9.59 6.27 
Mali 380 7.62 3.81 58 13.18 6.60 
Nepal 268 9.24 4.35 62 15.00 7.06 
Burkina Faso 326 8.33 4.05 48 17.47 8.49 
Niger 297 8.77 4.19 33 26.35 12.60 
Burundi 179 11.12 5.00 20 56.74 25.53 
Guinea 289 8.90 4.24 13 66.29 31.57 
Ethiopia 153 11.88 5.27 15 81.13 36.01 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 380 7.62 3.81 4 188.83 94.54 
       
 
 
Table A.2:  Impact of natural disasters on credit in selected countries (using 2011 
values) 
Country GDP pc ($) Effect in $ SD Credit pc ($) % Effect SD 
       
El Salvador 2,997 -2.03 2.15 132 -1.53 1.63 
Dominican Republic 4,927 -4.35 2.53 1,085 -0.40 0.23 
Ecuador 3,449 -2.68 2.23 973 -0.28 0.23 
Namibia 4,272 -3.68 2.39 2,052 -0.18 0.12 
Brazil 5,721 -5.05 2.69 3,184 -0.16 0.08 
Maldives 4,872 -4.30 2.52 3,866 -0.11 0.07 
Thailand 3,158 -2.27 2.18 3,219 -0.07 0.07 
United States 44,440 -14.62 5.80 23,386 -0.06 0.02 
Australia 36,495 -13.70 5.47 44,270 -0.03 0.01 
Ireland 45,385 -14.72 5.83 94,871 -0.02 0.01 
Sri Lanka 1,725 0.55 2.13 461 0.12 0.46 
India 1,086 2.71 2.45 512 0.53 0.48 
Bangladesh 569 5.73 3.23 254 2.26 1.27 
Pakistan 756 4.41 2.85 136 3.23 2.09 
Nepal 385 7.56 3.79 192 3.93 1.97 
Mali 497 6.36 3.42 96 6.65 3.57 
Burkina Faso 463 6.69 3.52 87 7.70 4.05 
Liberia 257 9.44 4.42 49 19.39 9.08 
Niger 272 9.19 4.33 35 25.94 12.24 
Guinea 304 8.65 4.16 20 42.57 20.44 
Burundi 152 11.89 5.28 26 46.56 20.66 
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Table A.3:  Models without the lagged dependent variable (fixed effects) 
 
Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) 
    
Disaster 142.6** 226.9** 259.1** 
 (63.29) (110.6) (125.3) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 3,812* 3,513 3,029 
 (2,299) (2,336) (1,906) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -18.65** -30.75* -34.88* 
 (8.891) (16.63) (18.72) 
Polity2  -467.8*** -479.1*** 
  (109.5) (108.8) 
Disaster * Polity2  2.38 2.78 
  (1.80) (2.15) 
Inflation  0.37* 0.36* 
  (0.21) (0.20) 
Disaster * Inflation  0.052 0.050 
  (0.038) (0.038) 
Government Expenditure  219.6*** 178.0** 
  (77.04) (72.86) 
Disaster * Govt. Expenditure  -0.70 -1.14 
  (2.03) (2.02) 
Trade Share   64.80 
   (46.27) 
    
Observations 4,352 3,564 3,558 
R-squared 0.169 0.225 0.244 
Number of Countries 177 151 151 
    
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at 
the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.4:  First difference linear estimator (all the variables are differenced except for disaster and GDP per capita) 
 
Dependant variable: Change in credit per capita   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Disaster 56.79*** 71.08*** 71.48*** 71.58*** 70.76*** 70.77*** 72.17*** 73.63*** 73.68*** 73.58*** 72.42*** 
 (13.26) (15.20) (16.15) (16.39) (16.28) (16.45) (16.91) (17.01) (17.02) (17.10) (16.03) 
GDP pc (in logs) 284.8*** 297.0*** 302.7*** 306.7*** 307.9*** 307.5*** 307.6*** 307.7*** 307.7*** 307.8*** 307.6*** 
 (40.25) (43.63) (46.71) (47.30) (47.53) (47.26) (47.27) (47.30) (47.31) (47.32) (47.20) 
Dis * ln GDP pc -7.89*** -10.30*** -10.38*** -10.34*** -10.22*** -10.22*** -10.41*** -10.59*** -10.59*** -10.57*** -10.39*** 
 (1.88) (2.20) (2.33) (2.35) (2.33) (2.35) (2.41) (2.43) (2.43) (2.46) (2.30) 
D. Polity2  -2.10 1.40 2.80 2.95 2.72 0.99 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.11 
  (4.20) (4.46) (4.69) (5.04) (5.05) (4.99) (4.99) (4.99) (4.99) (5.05) 
D. Agriculture share   -0.32 0.01 1.84 3.47 3.45 2.97 2.98 3.19 3.60 
   (3.45) (3.54) (3.88) (4.78) (4.78) (4.75) (4.75) (4.78) (5.7 
D. Inflation    -0.0103 -0.0109 -0.0087 -0.0086 -0.0087 -0.0076 -0.0084 -0.0080 
    (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0084) 
D. Govt. Exp.     12.96 11.11 11.08 11.06 11.10 12.11 12.11 
     (9.84) (11.06) (11.07) (11.06) (11.11) (11.59) (11.65) 
D. Trade Share      4.94 4.97 4.98 4.98 5.02 5.37 
      (5.63) (5.64) (5.64) (5.64) (5.65) (6.04) 
Dis * D. Polity2       0.84* 0.81 0.81 0.84* 0.71 
       (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
Dis * D. Agrshr        0.25 0.25 0.13 -0.05 
        (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.41) 
Dis * D. Inflation         -0.00131 6.69e-05 -0.000283 
         (0.00296) (0.00259) (0.00255) 
Dis * D. Govt. Exp.          -0.88 -0.79 
          (0.97) (0.96) 
Dis* D. Trade Share           -0.186 
           (0.248) 
Observations 4,155 3,611 3,155 3,085 2,997 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 2,991 
R-squared 0.090 0.170 0.166 0.168 0.170 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 
            
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to differencing. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5:  Aggregated (ten-year) data 
 
Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Disaster 1,035* 1,545** 1,895*** 2,141*** 2,125*** 1,978*** 1,915*** 2,269*** 2,074*** 
 (536) (628) (662) (701) (705) (660) (677) (825) (710) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 4,824* 4,189 4,419 4,161 4,153 4,727* 4,694* 4,028** 3,820** 
 (2,782) (2,844) (2,928) (2,921) (2,926) (2,459) (2,454) (1,901) (1,862) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -133.6* -205.8** -259.9*** -289.9*** -288.6*** -271.7*** -273.8*** -297.5*** -240.7** 
 (72.56) (90.33) (93.65) (100.0) (100.3) (96.31) (97.79) (110.4) (96.85) 
Polity2  -496.9*** -557.1*** -610.8*** -608.9*** -680.2*** -684.5*** -648.5*** -631.4*** 
  (124.2) (135.2) (144.4) (144.5) (161.2) (164.2) (153.6) (150.9) 
Disaster * Polity2   29.84* 28.51 28.29 29.03 28.92 22.37 15.50 
   (17.86) (18.20) (18.26) (18.19) (18.01) (18.03) (22.10) 
Inflation    1.295 1.147 0.717 0.717 0.619 0.714 
    (0.896) (0.978) (0.879) (0.877) (0.893) (0.944) 
Disaster * Inflation     0.144 0.263 0.273 0.358 0.289 
     (0.280) (0.244) (0.244) (0.288) (0.285) 
Government Expenditure      286.7** 275.9** 255.0** 230.3* 
      (111.0) (132.9) (120.3) (121.0) 
Disaster * Govt. Expenditure       4.632 -10.79 3.244 
       (17.26) (20.66) (18.35) 
Trade Share        88.39 99.64 
        (62.05) (66.92) 
Disaster * Trade         -5.486 
         (3.947) 
Observations 439 384 384 376 376 369 369 369 369 
R-squared 0.184 0.238 0.241 0.253 0.253 0.272 0.272 0.298 0.302 
Number of Countries 175 152 152 150 150 150 150 150 150 
          
Notes: Aggregated data in periods, 1979-2008. All models include a constant term, country and time fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6:  Models without credit outliers (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
w/o bot. 
10% 
w/o top 
10% 
w/o bot. & 
top 10% 
w/o bot. 
20% 
w/o top 
20% 
w/o bot. & 
top 20% 
       
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) 51.31** 23.36** 36.61*** 61.22** 6.906** 14.81** 
 (20.29) (10.09) (11.99) (26.54) (3.339) (6.991) 
Lagged Credit per capita 0.998*** 1.010*** 1.007*** 0.996*** 1.021*** 1.005*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0222) (0.0225) (0.0175) (0.0226) (0.0226) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 844.7*** 361.4*** 478.9*** 1,012*** 161.9*** 270.9*** 
 (228.4) (83.14) (110.1) (273.2) (32.05) (53.51) 
Dis * ln GDP per capita -6.545*** -3.072** -4.644*** -7.912*** -0.893** -1.919** 
 (2.377) (1.367) (1.510) (3.026) (0.450) (0.892) 
Share of Agriculture 27.04** 5.739*** 9.930*** 38.30** 1.630* 3.887 
 (11.40) (2.136) (3.425) (17.06) (0.929) (2.521) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.253 -0.0963** -0.185** -0.162 -0.0246 -0.0379 
 (0.171) (0.0437) (0.0866) (0.243) (0.0162) (0.0464) 
Polity2 -0.575 3.091 2.627 -2.370 0.621 1.513 
 (5.955) (2.026) (2.271) (7.156) (1.041) (1.729) 
       
Observations 2,794 2,840 2,445 2,447 2,617 1,875 
R-squared 0.958 0.931 0.932 0.959 0.935 0.937 
Number of Countries 144 141 138 131 125 109 
       
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, 
country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A.7:  Models without disaster outliers (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
w/o top 27 obs w/o top 55 obs w/o yr 2004 w/o yrs 2004-2005 
     
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) 39.80** 37.32** 36.79*** 39.07*** 
 (17.57) (17.84) (13.71) (13.24) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0176) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 662.2*** 660.9*** 687.1*** 680.8*** 
 (177.6) (178.3) (181.5) (174.6) 
Dis * ln GDP per capita -5.591** -4.976** -4.877*** -5.196*** 
 (2.192) (2.208) (1.745) (1.666) 
Share of Agriculture 15.56** 15.56** 16.63** 16.29** 
 (6.989) (7.021) (7.338) (7.110) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.0922 -0.0965 -0.137* -0.137* 
 (0.137) (0.145) (0.0777) (0.0799) 
Polity2 -1.194 -1.229 -0.817 0.111 
 (5.318) (5.342) (5.409) (5.330) 
     
Observations 3,178 3,168 3,053 2,918 
R-squared 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 
Number of Countries 147 147 147 147 
     
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, 
country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.8:  Models with main control variables (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) 38.28** 41.68*** 41.12*** 43.19*** 36.56** 36.56** 36.86** 
 (14.76) (15.08) (15.07) (15.76) (15.93) (16.04) (16.34) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.000*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 656*** 661*** 660*** 709*** 711*** 702*** 703*** 
 (177) (179) (178) (196) (196) (190) (191) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -5.04*** -5.39*** -5.34*** -5.53*** -5.60*** -5.60*** -5.48** 
 (1.87) (1.91) (1.90) (1.97) (2.0) (2.01) (2.15) 
Share of Agriculture  15.70** 16.47** 16.43** 15.91* 15.79* 16.38* 16.43* 
 (7.03) (7.45) (7.44) (8.46) (8.45) (9.36) (9.40) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.15* -0.18** -0.19** -0.22** -0.16* -0.16 -0.17* 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.091) (0.091) (0.096) (0.088) 
Polity2 -1.33 -1.02 -1.03 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.77 
 (5.40) (5.66) (5.67) (6.07) (6.07) (6.13) (6.12) 
Disaster * Polity2 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Inflation  0.0106 0.0104 0.0117 0.0115 0.0102 0.0103 
  (0.0182) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0183) (0.0184) 
Disaster * Inflation   0.0120 0.00983 0.0184 0.0176 0.0157 
   (0.0157) (0.0186) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0174) 
Government Expenditure    -9.67 -10.21 -10.17 -10.28 
    (8.37) (8.47) (8.60) (8.61) 
Disaster * Govt. Expenditure     0.348 0.337 0.394 
     (0.215) (0.214) (0.263) 
Trade Share      1.23 1.26 
      (4.16) (4.19) 
Disaster * Trade share       -0.017 
       (0.03) 
Observations 3,189 3,130 3,130 3,047 3,047 3,041 3,041 
R-squared 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 
Number of Countries 147 145 145 145 145 145 145 
        
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.9:  Models with further control variables (fixed effects)  
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Disaster (% Population Affected) 8.20** 44.38** 26.92** 24.17** 23.50** 4.82* 
 (3.19) (22.30) (13.52) (11.19) (9.63) (2.79) 
Lagged Credit per capita 0.846*** 1.012*** 1.021*** 1.040*** 1.084*** 1.014*** 
 (0.052) (0.022) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.028) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 239*** 1,120*** 548*** 348*** 64 138*** 
 (70.7) (337.6) (146.4) (101.8) (138.0) (36.1) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -1.12*** -5.83** -3.64** -3.32** -3.36*** -0.63 
 (0.42) (2.68) (1.74) (1.47) (1.24) (0.39) 
Share of Agriculture  3.34** 28.93** 9.74* 7.58 1.72 0.64 
 (1.52) (13.23) (5.03) (5.42) (5.24) (0.71) 
Disaster *Agriculture -0.034 -0.219 -0.101 -0.097 -0.075 -0.017 
 (0.023) (0.189) (0.073) (0.059) (0.055) (0.014) 
Polity2  -7.84 3.85 5.21 10.48* 0.48 
  (8.65) (5.55) (4.09) (5.52) (0.94) 
Non-life Insurance Premia (% GDP)  -96.92     
  (84.43)     
Financial Sector Rating 49.69*      
 (25.87)      
Lending Interest Rate   0.892    
   (0.547)    
Share of Resource Rent (% GDP)    -578**   
    (257)   
Share of Forestry Rent (% GDP)     5.15e-09  
     (4.90e-08)  
Disaster * Polity2      0.013 
      (0.023) 
Official Dev. Assistance (% GNI)      0.393 
      (0.490) 
Observations 424 2,157 2,452 2,341 2,814 2,415 
R-squared 0.891 0.950 0.957 0.955 0.963 0.954 
Number of Countries 71 140 138 129 139 112 
       
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.10:  Quantile regression results 
 Dependent Variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) 
Q25 Q50 Q75 
    
Disaster (% Pop. Affected) 290*** 974*** 1,455*** 
 (69.1) (165.5) (524.2) 
GDP pc (in logs) 1,190*** 3,595*** 7,536*** 
 (185.9) (244.4) (312.8) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -37.4*** -121.8*** -192.0*** 
 (8.58) (20.00) (62.18) 
Share of Agriculture 37.2*** 148.2*** 326.3*** 
 (7.52) (15.52) (33.75) 
Disaster * Agriculture -1.36*** -5.43*** -6.07 
 (0.43) (1.34) (4.02) 
Polity2 6.62** 36.94*** 89.86*** 
 (3.35) (10.42) (26.63) 
    
Observations 3,323 3,323 3,323 
Pseudo 𝑅𝑅2 0.0761 0.1591 0.3514 
    
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011 and all models include a constant term. Simultaneous quantile regression bootstrap 
(100) SEs. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A.11:  Controlling for prices across space (variables in PPP constant 2005 US$, 
fixed effects) 
 
 
(1) (2) 
Dep.var.: Credit per capita Dep.var.: Logged credit per capita 
   
Disaster (% Population Affected)  30.05** 0.0105* 
 (13.57) (0.00531) 
Lagged Credit per capita 0.995***  
 (0.0124)  
Lagged Credit per capita (in logs)  0.833*** 
  (0.0244) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 710.1*** 0.297*** 
 (168.3) (0.0439) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -3.553** -0.00133** 
 (1.587) (0.000605) 
Share of Agriculture  13.84** -0.00491** 
 (6.382) (0.00215) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.111 -4.46e-05 
 (0.0763) (3.96e-05) 
Polity2 -3.539 0.000748 
 (4.945) (0.00191) 
   
Observations 3,101 3,101 
R-squared 0.957 0.916 
Number of Countries 140   140 
   
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A.12:  Natural disasters in different geographical regions 1 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Asia Africa Europe Americas 
     
Disaster (% pop. affected) 128.3* -0.294 -519.2 -79.93 
 (64.91) (1.215) (470.5) (89.76) 
Lagged Credit per capita 0.942*** 1.009*** 0.980*** 0.877*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0339) (0.0211) (0.0173) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 963.7** 56.17** 1,925** 755.1*** 
 (382.7) (21.75) (945.0) (203.9) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -15.78* 0.0158 48.42 9.750 
 (8.140) (0.184) (45.57) (11.64) 
Share of Agriculture 17.86 0.111 107.2** -3.246 
 (19.83) (0.414) (49.93) (5.192) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.722* 0.00937 6.670 0.370 
 (0.382) (0.00687) (6.456) (0.275) 
Polity2 7.250 -0.448 -120.1** 8.775* 
 (9.135) (0.458) (52.32) (4.563) 
     
Observations 772 1,119 669 494 
R-squared 0.923 0.957 0.965 0.901 
Number of Countries 37 47 35 23 
     
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, 
country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.13:  Natural disasters in different geographical regions 2 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
Western Europe &    
N. America 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  
Middle East &   
N. Africa 
South Asia Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
        
Disaster (% population affected) 192.9** 90.74 16,049 5.333 -376.6 -6.183 -0.538 
 (78.04) (55.60) (18,446) (10.05) (727.4) (6.983) (1.164) 
Lagged Credit pc 0.992*** 1.001*** 0.955*** 0.921*** 0.721*** 1.138*** 1.017*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0171) (0.0326) (0.0390) (0.0725) (0.129) (0.0384) 
GDP pc (in logs) 809.7* 320.1 13,440** 550.2*** -658.5 52.19 52.21** 
 (399.1) (220.6) (5,557) (155.2) (706.7) (33.92) (23.78) 
Disaster * ln GDP pc -23.24** -11.00 -1,529 -1.360 52.16 0.656 0.0510 
 (8.629) (7.056) (1,722) (1.337) (95.13) (1.059) (0.176) 
Share of Agriculture  -4.922 25.10*** 469.5* -4.120 9.567 -0.945** 0.238 
 (28.24) (6.295) (268.1) (5.192) (6.698) (0.315) (0.364) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.947 -0.603 -67.65 0.144* -1.296 0.0821 0.00974 
 (0.563) (0.378) (256.0) (0.0791) (1.957) (0.0582) (0.00750) 
Polity2 5.582 -20.15** -156.1 8.145** -49.84* 0.709 -0.192 
 (8.888) (9.008) (283.8) (3.715) (26.55) (0.905) (0.387) 
        
Observations 461 387 420 477 270 172 1,002 
R-squared 0.967 0.976 0.970 0.912 0.668 0.974 0.956 
Number of Countries 18 24 20 21 16 6 42 
        
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.14:  Pair-wise correlation between different disaster subgroups 
 All Disasters Biological Climatic Hydrological Geophysical Meteorological 
All Disasters 1.0000      
Biological 0.0795 1.0000     
Climatic 0.7552 0.0131 1.0000    
Hydrological 0.2671 0.0012 0.0023 1.0000   
Geophysical 0.1321 0.0732 -0.0006 -0.0024 1.0000  
Meteorological 0.5825 -0.0012 -0.0026 0.0136 -0.0024 1.0000  
Table A.15:  Different disaster subgroups – baseline specification  
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
 Fixed Effects 
  
Biological Disasters (% Population Affected) 422.2** 
 (210.9) 
Climatic Disasters (% Population Affected) 34.02** 
 (16.02) 
Geophysical Disasters (% Population Affected) 569.8*** 
 (199.6) 
Hydrological Disasters (% Population Affected) 24.65 
 (39.89) 
Meteorological Disasters (% Population Affected) -10.95 
 (34.22) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.000*** 
 (0.0173) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 661.8*** 
 (178.5) 
Biological * ln GDP per capita -54.65* 
 (28.64) 
Climatic * ln GDP per capita -4.551** 
 (2.147) 
Geophysical * ln GDP per capita -71.10*** 
 (24.27) 
Hydrological * ln GDP per capita -3.354 
 (4.886) 
Meteorological * ln GDP per capita 1.281 
 (4.191) 
Share of Agriculture 15.65** 
 (7.033) 
Biological * Agriculture -2.394* 
 (1.289) 
Climatic * Agriculture -0.133* 
 (0.0799) 
Geophysical * Agriculture -2.807*** 
 (1.063) 
Hydrological * Agriculture 0.0593 
 (0.384) 
Meteorological * Agriculture 0.116 
 (0.238) 
Polity2 -1.081 
 (5.310) 
  
Observations 3,189 
Number of Countries 147 
R-squared 0.958 
  
  
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.16:  Regressions without biological disasters (alternative estimators) 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) 
Fixed Effects OLS System GMM 
    
Disasters without Bio (% Pop. Affected) 33.62** 62.31*** 110.4** 
 (14.08) (16.42) (54.12) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.000*** 1.027*** 0.962*** 
 (0.0172) (0.00714) (0.0195) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 652.7*** 228.6*** 556.4*** 
 (176.2) (53.69) (182.7) 
Disaster without Bio * ln GDP per capita -4.457** -7.787*** -14.69** 
 (1.814) (1.966) (6.880) 
Share of Agriculture  15.61** 13.32*** 24.85*** 
 (7.005) (3.583) (8.001) 
Disaster without Bio * Agriculture -0.127* -0.328*** -0.438 
 (0.0756) (0.110) (0.436) 
Polity2 -1.104 6.390** 26.83** 
 (5.273) (2.698) (12.95) 
    
Observations 3,189 3,189 3,189 
R-squared 0.958 0.992  
Number of Countries 147  147 
Number of Instruments   109 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(1)   0.278 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(2)   0.053 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(3)   0.156 
Arellano-Bond Test AR(4)   0.283 
Hansen Test    0.841 
    
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, 
country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 No. of lags used to instrument the endogenous disaster variables in system GMM regression limited 
to 10 starting at lag 3. 
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Table A.17:  Using binary disaster variable with different thresholds (baseline, fixed effects) 
  Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
Different thresholds used on the percentage of population affected by disasters to isolate severe disasters 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
> 0 > 0.5% > 1% > 2.5% > 5% > 5.5% > 6% > 7.5% > 10% 
          
Disaster Dummy 181.8 256.2 326.1 449.3 558.0 875.2** 935.2** 748.1** 1,006** 
 (813.1) (503.4) (346.1) (331.3) (394.7) (399.5) (404.8) (369.9) (400.1) 
Lagged Credit pc 0.999*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
ln GDP pc  648.7*** 650.7*** 653.0*** 655.9*** 655.8*** 660.0*** 659.4*** 654.8*** 655.2*** 
 (198.7) (173.9) (174.6) (175.6) (174.5) (175.1) (175.1) (176.7) (176.9) 
Dis * ln GDP pc -24.52 -35.40 -50.02 -69.25* -83.03* -119.9** -126.5** -102.3** -130.9*** 
 (99.12) (63.82) (43.90) (40.63) (49.41) (50.60) (51.21) (46.23) (48.71) 
Agri. Share 16.88** 15.50** 15.29** 15.19** 15.32** 15.52** 15.58** 15.50** 15.60** 
 (7.839) (6.882) (6.810) (6.882) (6.891) (6.929) (6.946) (6.985) (6.999) 
Dis * Agri. -2.023 -0.784 0.0314 0.802 -0.185 -2.599 -3.250 -2.160 -3.959 
 (5.226) (3.298) (2.598) (2.875) (3.173) (3.130) (3.115) (2.861) (3.123) 
Polity2 -1.414 -1.368 -1.408 -1.477 -1.226 -1.153 -1.206 -1.191 -1.198 
 (5.134) (5.236) (5.251) (5.277) (5.304) (5.301) (5.293) (5.278) (5.279) 
          
Observations 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 
R-squared 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 
Countries 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
          
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.18:  Binary disaster variable without disaster-agriculture interaction (fixed effects) 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
Different thresholds used on the percentage of population affected by disasters to isolate severe disasters for analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
>0% >0.5% >1% >2.5% >5% >5.5% >6% >7.5% >10% 
          
Disaster Dummy 10.60 184.9 328.9* 521.0*** 541.5** 638.2*** 637.1*** 544.9**  645.7*** 
 (398.6) (244.8) (189.6) (180.7) (213.2) (229.6) (233.8) (224.7) (231.3) 
Lagged Credit pc 0.999*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
GDP pc (in logs) 638.1*** 649.0*** 653.0*** 656.8*** 655.6*** 657.6*** 656.5*** 652.8*** 651.6*** 
 (185.6) (174.4) (175.6) (176.2) (175.3) (175.6) (175.4) (176.6) (176.5) 
Dis * ln GDP pc -7.212 -27.83 -50.32* -76.94*** -81.25** -94.28*** -94.23*** -80.21** -92.04*** 
 (57.67) (37.31) (29.06) (26.61) (32.32) (34.97) (35.57) (33.40) (34.28) 
Agri. Share 15.53** 15.30** 15.29** 15.30** 15.30** 15.27** 15.28** 15.33** 15.33** 
 (7.043) (6.979) (6.965) (6.970) (6.970) (6.969) (6.970) (6.980) (6.977) 
Polity2 -1.413 -1.373 -1.408 -1.473 -1.229 -1.202 -1.253 -1.229 -1.252 
 (5.133) (5.234) (5.244) (5.272) (5.291) (5.287) (5.283) (5.269) (5.273) 
          
Observations 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 3,189 
R-squared 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 
Number of Countries 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
          
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A.19:  Impact disaster variable  
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) 
Intensity>0.0001 Severe Intensity>0.01 
   
Disaster Impact Variable -1,220 -1,750 
 (991.4) (1,567) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0171) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 529.8*** 550.6*** 
 (147.1) (146.4) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita 141.4 207.5 
 (115.7) (188.8) 
Share of Agriculture 7.880 10.19* 
 (6.017) (5.536) 
Disaster * Agriculture 9.806 14.31 
 (7.435) (11.23) 
Polity2 -1.376 -1.811 
 (5.279) (5.463) 
   
Observations 3,189 3,189 
R-squared 0.958 0.958 
Number of Countries 147 147 
   
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A.20:  Impact disaster variable with limited controls 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intensity>0.0001 Intensity>0.01 Intensity>0.05 Intensity>0. 1 
     
Disaster Impact Variable 49.55 84.73 102.7 98.99 
 (62.75) (68.72) (76.92) (78.37) 
Lagged Credit per capita 0.995*** 0.994*** 0.994*** 0.994*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 658.3** 649.3** 643.9** 643.3** 
 (314.4) (311.0) (309.1) (308.9) 
     
Observations 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 
R-squared 0.943 0.943 0.943 0.943 
Number of Countries 176 176 176 176 
     
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.21:  Weighed disaster variable 
 Dependent variable: Credit per capita 
Fixed Effects 
  
Disaster (% Pop. affected, adjusted for onset month) 28.09 
 (17.37) 
Lagged Credit per capita 1.003*** 
 (0.0230) 
GDP per capita (in logs) 361.7*** 
 (129.5) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -3.308 
 (2.102) 
Share of Agriculture 4.606 
 (5.620) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.144 
 (0.131) 
Polity2 2.705 
 (5.998) 
  
Observations 2,100 
Number of Countries 141 
R-squared 0.975 
  
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A.22:  Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (%) as the dependent 
variable  
 Dependent variable: Liquid assets to deposits & short term funding (%) 
Fixed Effects 
  
Disaster (% pop. affected) 1.961** 
 (0.848) 
LDV 0.665*** 
 (0.0554) 
GDP pc (in logs) -8.415** 
 (3.306) 
Disaster * ln GDP pc -0.237** 
 (0.103) 
Share of Agriculture  0.130 
 (0.102) 
Disaster * Agriculture -0.0149** 
 (0.00687) 
Polity2 -0.122 
 (0.143) 
  
Observations 1,734 
R-squared 0.475 
Number of Countries 148 
  
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. Model includes a constant term, country 
and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table A.23:  Indicators for financial depth 
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  gfdd_di_02 – Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%), gfdd_di_03 – Nonbank financial institutions’ assets to GDP (%), gfdd_di_08 
– Financial system deposits to GDP (%), gfdd_di_09 – Life insurance premium volume to GDP (%), gfdd_di_10 – Nonlife insurance premium volume to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_01 – Stock market 
capitalisation to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_02 – Stock market total value traded to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_03 – Outstanding domestic private debt securities to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_04 – Outstanding 
domestic public debt securities to GDP (%), gfdd_dm_07 – International debt issues to GDP (%)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
gfdd_di_02 gfdd_di_03 gfdd_di_08 gfdd_di_09 gfdd_di_10 gfdd_dm_01 gfdd_dm_02 gfdd_dm_03 gfdd_dm_04 gfdd_dm_07 
           
Disaster 0.0815 -0.282 0.0720 -0.0242 -0.00917 -0.530 3.320 -0.754** -0.865** -0.519 
 (0.116) (0.186) (0.0810) (0.0218) (0.00922) (0.627) (3.476) (0.356) (0.379) (0.519) 
Dis * ln GDP pc -0.0115 0.0353 -0.0107 0.00204 0.00145 0.0653 -0.361 0.0840** 0.0893** 0.0553 
 (0.0142) (0.0212) (0.00987) (0.00271) (0.00108) (0.0752) (0.394) (0.0347) (0.0370) (0.0590) 
           
Observations 3,193 873 3,176 2,050 2,272 1,572 1,540 705 828 1,040 
R-squared 0.929 0.947 0.907 0.666 0.810 0.621 0.571 0.928 0.942 0.948 
No. of Countries 148 56 147 140 144 100 99 43 48 82 
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Table A.24:  Indicators for financial access 
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, gfdd_ai_01 – Bank accounts per 1000 adults, gfdd_ai_02 – Bank branches per 100,000 adults, gfdd_am_01 – Value traded excluding 
top 10 traded companies to total value traded (%), gfdd_am_02 – Market capitalisation excluding top 10 companies to total market capitalisation (%), gfdd_am_03 – Nonfinancial corporate bonds 
to total bonds and notes outstanding (%) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
gfdd_ai_01 gfdd_ai_02 gfdd_am_01 gfdd_am_02 gfdd_am_03 
      
Disaster 0.535 0.0356 0.679 -0.497 0.136 
 (8.587) (0.0400) (2.795) (2.326) (0.285) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita -0.487 -0.00696 -0.107 0.0418 -0.0130 
 (1.396) (0.00611) (0.293) (0.259) (0.0285) 
      
Observations 347 844 443 450 219 
R-squared 0.683 0.526 0.397 0.419 0.841 
Number of Countries 62 131 43 43 23 
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Table A.25:  Indicators for financial efficiency 
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, gfdd_ei_01 – Bank net interest margin (%), gfdd_ei_02 – Bank lending-deposit spread, gfdd_ei_03 – Bank noninterest income to 
total income (%), gfdd_ei_04 – Bank overhead costs to total assets (%), gfdd_ei_05 – Bank return on assets (%, after tax), gfdd_ei_06 – Bank return on equity (%, after tax), gfdd_ei_09 – Bank 
return on assets (%, before tax), gfdd_ei_10 – Bank return on equity (%, before tax), gfdd_em_01 – Stock market turnover ratio (%) 
 
Table A.26:  Indicators for financial stability  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ln(gfdd_si_01) gfdd_si_02 gfdd_si_03 gfdd_si_04 gfdd_si_05 gfdd_si_07 gfdd_sm_01 
        
Disaster -0.0151 -0.0242 0.464 -0.118 0.412 2.462 0.856 
 (0.0306) (0.304) (0.309) (0.420) (0.507) (3.100) (0.903) 
Disaster * ln GDP per capita 0.0012 -0.00726 -0.0517 -0.00162 -0.0442 -0.156 -0.0782 
 (0.0037) (0.0361) (0.0369) (0.0514) (0.0548) (0.363) (0.0907) 
        
Observations 1,531 1,012 997 3,630 1,019 870 1,092 
R-squared 0.188 0.653 0.464 0.740 0.378 0.502 0.645 
Number of Countries 142 96 96 149 96 95 75 
        
Notes: Annual data 1979-2011, except where first observation lost due to lags. All models include a constant term, country and year fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, gfdd_si_01 – Bank Z-score, gfdd_si_02 – Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%), gfdd_si_03 – Bank capital to total assets 
(%), gfdd_si_04 – Bank credit to bank deposits (%), gfdd_si_05 – Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%), gfdd_si_06 – Liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (%), gfdd_si_07 
– Provisions to nonperforming loans (%), gfdd_sm_01 – Stock price volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 gfdd_ei_01 gfdd_ei_02 gfdd_ei_03 gfdd_ei_04 gfdd_ei_05 gfdd_ei_06 gfdd_ei_09 gfdd_ei_10 gfdd_em_01 
          
Disaster 0.0897 0.113 0.133 -0.0147 -0.251 0.626 -0.275 0.741 1.156 
 (0.172) (0.119) (0.463) (0.0986) (0.237) (1.465) (0.251) (1.974) (1.130) 
Disaster * ln GDP pc -0.0103 -0.0133 -0.0295 0.000569 0.0306 -0.0625 0.0338 -0.0641 -0.101 
 (0.0197) (0.0138) (0.0602) (0.0115) (0.0282) (0.168) (0.0298) (0.224) (0.134) 
          
Observations 1,575 2,521 1,710 1,580 1,581 1,578 1,581 1,578 1,531 
R-squared 0.113 0.524 0.309 0.154 0.033 0.101 0.038 0.114 0.476 
Number of Countries 147 140 148 147 147 147 147 147 99 
          
